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This project provides an analysis of the Army’s acquisition of the Nett Warrior (NW) 
soldier system. Its objectives are to document the legacy of the system and provide an 
overview of how acquisition strategy has adapted with respect to key acquisition 
elements since its inception on September 8, 1993. The product is a document that 
provides an analysis of the actions taken and the obstacles encountered and how the 
warfighters, user representatives, materiel developers, and lawmakers dealt with them. 
The NW need was approved in February 2009. The requirement was to provide 
improvements for dismounted soldiers in the five specific capability categories of 
lethality, command and control, mobility, survivability, and sustainment. For a period 
lasting approximately 20 years, the NW has evolved. Despite the Army’s decision to 
terminate the Land Warrior, the predecessor system to the Nett Warrior, in FY 2007, the 
NW’s foundation for follow-on soldier system initiatives had been established. The 
success of NW will be dependent upon the program’s ability to incorporate soldier-driven 
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Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of 
the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and 
women. (President Ronald Reagan; Department of the Army [DA], 2005b) 
President Ronald Reagan was referring to the fact that regardless of the 
technology we develop, the American Soldier will always remain the centerpiece of our 
military organizations. “The Army’s proud history and traditions point to the countless 
men and women who have been and are committed to defending the American way of 
life, citizens who answer the call to duty. Many have made the ultimate sacrifice. Today’s 
soldiers, bound together through the trials of service and combat, hold fast to the 
professional standards embodied in the Army values and the warrior ethos. In so doing, 
they will continue to inspire the Nation and the next generation that answers the call to 
duty” (DA, 2005b, p. 4–13). 
In the past two decades, the American military has advanced technologically at an 
unprecedented rate. More important, it has integrated technology into combined arms and 
joint operations beyond the militaries of most other nations. From the operational and 
tactical perspectives, military professionals exercise their expertise against intelligent 
adversaries actively seeking to defeat them in life-and-death situations (DA, 2005b).  
Soldiers, rather than equipment, are the centerpiece of the Army’s formation and 
vision for the future. In what way might the military increase situational awareness (SA), 
enabling soldiers in small units to conduct a higher level of precision maneuver based on 
intelligence data received prior to and during the conduct of military operations? This 
increased awareness and understanding would enhance the ability of units to anticipate 
and respond to enemy contacts. Leaders would be able to exploit SA to better 
synchronize maneuvers and supporting fires (Project Manager—Soldier Warrior [PM–
Soldier], 2010).  
One materiel solution, identified as early as 1992, was an integrated, body-worn 
fighting system that supported the mission of the dismounted combat soldier. The system 
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has had many names over its tenure. It has been called Land Warrior (LW), Ground 
Soldier System (GSS), and Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE), but most recently its name 
was changed to Nett Warrior (NW), after a Medal of Honor winner from World War II 
(Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center–White Sands Missile Range [TRAC–
WSMR], 2011).  
The Ground Soldier System Increment I (Nett Warrior or NW) Capability 
Development Document (CDD) defines the user’s operational requirements for NW. The 
NW program is using an incremental development approach to accelerate fielding of an 
integrated dismounted weapon system. The NW system is a sub-element of the Future 
Force Warrior (FFW),1 which integrates multiple soldier systems and components while 
leveraging emerging technologies to provide overmatching operational capabilities to all 
ground combatant soldiers, small units, and their attachments (PM–Soldier, 2010).   
Founded on lessons learned from earlier developments, the NW program 
harnesses soldiers’ field experience, technology maturation, fiscal constraints, and 
refinement of user requirements.  NW is intended to address operational requirements 
that focus primarily on providing the dismounted soldier with improved SA and 
command and control, and with hands-free full color displays down to the team leader 
(PM–Soldier, 2010).  
These requirements translate into the user being at the right place, at the right 
time, with the right equipment, and with near-real-time information. As a result, the new 
system transforms how Army leaders make decisions and operate so they can be more 
effective and lethal in executing their combat missions. Improved SA will minimize 
fratricide and enhance synchronization between maneuver elements, support elements, 
and other attachments. This capability will be provided by an affordable, tailored system 
approach that provides required operational capabilities by position within the echelon 
(PM–Soldier, 2010). The NW provides functional enhancements to the warfighter in line 
with rebalancing the force outlined in the Army Field Manual 1 (FM-1). Additionally, it 
supports the Army’s vision of facilitating a modular force that can rapidly move 
                                                 
1 The FFW is a subsystem of the Future Combat Systems project whose goal is to create a lightweight 
fully integrated infantry combat system. 
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wherever needed, applying a more diverse set of capabilities while maintaining the 
capacity to conduct sustainment operations, allowing it to transition among operations 
better than its predecessors (DA, 2005b).   
Our overarching purpose in this case study was to determine why this system has 
taken 20 years to evolve and to examine why it is still failing to meet Milestone Decision 
Authority approval for full-rate production despite deploying multiple times to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Through in-theater assessments (ITA), it has proven itself operationally 
effective—in most programs, this would be enough to move to full-rate production and 
deployment to applicable units Army-wide. As we demonstrate in later chapters, soldiers 
who used this system became so dependent on it that they would not leave the forward 
operating base (FOB) without it.  
The LW system was terminated as a program of record in February 2007, but still 
deployed for 15 months with 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment (4–9 IN), 4th (Stryker) 
Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division from April 2006 to July 2008. The specific version of the 
LW system was called the “Manchu” in honor of 49 IN. Based on its achievements with 
4–9 IN, an operational needs statement (ONS) was submitted by 5th (Stryker) Brigade, 
2nd Infantry Division (5/2 SBCT).  This urgent operational requirement for warfighting 
capabilities allowed the LW system to continue service. It was refined, given a faster 
processor, and renamed the Land Warrior–Strike (LW–Strike). From 2009 to 2010, the 
system deployed to Afghanistan with 5/2 SBCT (TRAC–WSMR, 2010). The hard work 
of the LW stakeholders led to the NW’s development and refinement. We believe it is 
their combined efforts that enabled the system to exist today.  
B. OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH OF THIS STUDY 
In this project we analyze the Army’s acquisition strategy for the Nett Warrior 
(NW) system as it relates to select acquisition strategy elements. The elements addressed 
in this report are mission need, test and evaluation, technology, and risk management. 
This project’s objectives are to document the legacy of the system and provide an 
overview of how the acquisition strategy, with respect to key acquisition elements, has 
adapted since its inception on September 8, 1993. In this project we analyze the actions 
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taken by the materiel developers, user representatives, lawmakers and warfighters 
working together to overcome obstacles in order to deliver revolutionary capabilities to 
the ground-fighting soldier.   
Our analysis focused on the following questions: 
• What are the current challenges of the program, and how have they been addressed? 
• How has LW’s performance in other units (4–9 IN, 5/2 SBCT, 2SCR, and 1/25 
SBCT) affected its successor, the Nett Warrior?  
• What is the acquisition strategy behind the Nett Warrior program?   
In order to answer these research objectives, we spoke with several stakeholders 
in the Nett Warrior community.  We conducted interviews and corresponded with key 
government officials and contracting personnel, reviewed historical documentation, 
consulted with colleagues and faculty, reviewed past model and simulation analyses, and 
conducted after-action reviews. We compiled and reviewed data in order to draw 
conclusions and report findings that address our research questions. We organized these 
findings into separate perspectives defined in the Scope section.  
Interviews and reports that captured the unique insights of key players within the 
NW program were critical to a complete representation of the issues discussed in this 
case study.  We interviewed or used existing reports from the following stakeholders: 
• PM Nett Warrior; 
• PM Soldier Warrior (PM–SWAR) office; 
• Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Soldier (TCM–S); 
• Maneuver Battle Lab (MBL); 
• Training and Doctrine Command Requirements Analysis Center–White Sands 
Missile Range (TRAC–WSMR);  
• Training and Doctrine Command Requirements Analysis Center–Monterey (TRAC–
Monterey); and 
• Systems Integration/Robotics Contracting Group, United States Army TACOM Life 
Cycle Management Command. 
C. SCOPE 
Our goal was to provide a comprehensive case analysis of the acquisition of the 
Nett Warrior system and the accomplishments of its predecessor, the Land Warrior 
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system. Our analysis begins where a 2008 Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) MBA 
Professional Report left off; the earlier report is entitled, The Land Warrior Soldier 
System: A Case Study for the Acquisition of Soldier Systems, by Nile L. Clifton and 
Doug W. Copeland.  Their report ends with the LW deployment with 4–9 IN to Iraq in 
March 2008.  Our report begins with analysis of the 4–9 IN in-theater assessment 
conducted by TCM–S, published October 27, 2008.  We chose to analyze the LW system 
beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2006 in order to incorporate the 4–9 IN legacy. We focused 
on milestones that the LW system achieved that led to the development of the Nett 
Warrior system. It would have been nearly impossible to address all aspects of this highly 
complex program within the limited scope of this MBA project report.  We do not 
address how Net-centric warfare influenced the program or how the Joint Capabilities 
Integration & Development System (JCIDS) influenced the key performance parameters 
(KPP), capability constraints, and schedule. It was not possible to interview all relevant 
NW/LW participants due to time and resource constraints. In this report we provide an 
initial evaluation of the Nett Warrior system leading up to the completion of the Limited 
User Test (LUT) through the introduction of smartphone technology.    
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
In Chapter I, we introduce and frame the case study.  In Chapter II we provide the 
historical background of the Land Warrior System and detail the incremental approach 
toward the current status of the Nett Warrior system. In Chapter III we depict how the 
program was developed with respect to the user community. In Chapter IV we portray the 
acquisition strategy and challenges from the materiel developer’s perspective and outline 
some of the development, production, and evaluation challenges.  In Chapter V we 
identify budgeting constraints and other externalities that influenced the acquisition 
strategy.   
In Chapter VI we summarize the next steps, capture lessons learned, and provide 
recommendations for further research endeavors concerning the development of a 
soldier-worn command and control system.    
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II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR THE NW SYSTEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
"You look at something like the F-22 and the Abrams tanks and you say 
these are decisive weapons—as soon as the bad guy knows he's going to 
be flying against an F-22, he doesn't even want to leave the ground. We 
need to make the U.S. Army Soldier and Marine decisive weapons, and 
the way you do that is you use Net[t] Warrior. There is no reason in the 
world why ... a Soldier can't know everything that is moving within a 
kilometer and he and his leadership can figure out what to do about that 
thing." Mal O'Neill, assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics, and Technology (ASA[AL&T]). (Lopez, 2010). 
 “The Soldier is the Army’s most vulnerable asset and is susceptible to 
almost every threat known on the battlefield.” (TRADOC, 2006, p. 19).  
The Army is in a constant state of transformation. It is rich with a history of 
continuous change while performing its mission. Since the 1980s, the Army has been a 
national leader in anticipating and leading change. Its deliberate study of technical and 
professional developments, focused collection and analysis of data from operational and 
training events, free-ranging experimentation, and transformational processes have made 
it a model of effective innovation (DA, 2005b). In order to maintain focus on innovation, 
the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) is constantly looking for ways to keep the force 
deployable in order to fight and win anywhere in the world within 48 hours.    
October 1999 was no different in the Army’s history. Then-CSA General Eric 
Shinseki introduced the Army’s transformation strategy, which was intended to convert 
all of the Army’s divisions, called Legacy Forces, into new organizations, called the 
Objective Force—a networked system of systems that included both the LW and Future 
Combat System (FCS). General Shinseki’s decision was said to be in light of the 
controversial Task Force (TF) Hawk deployment to Kosovo and Albania in 1999 
(Feickert, 2006). General Shinseki’s intent was to make the Army lighter, more modular, 
and, more importantly, more deployable (Feickert, 2006). 
In August 2003, the newly designated CSA, General Peter Schoomaker, changed 
the Army’s transformation plan and re-designated the Objective Force as the Future 
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Force, emphasizing the importance of fielding useful FCS program capabilities as soon as 
they became available. Under General Schoomaker’s vision, the Army would not wait a 
decade or more before new technologies and vehicular platforms could be integrated into 
the force (Feickert, 2006). General Schoomaker’s vision was more holistic and jointly 
applied than his predecessor’s. His intent was to deploy relevant technologies, placing 
more emphasis on Army networks linking forces with each other and with units from 
other Services.   
Before Generals Shinseki and Schoomaker implemented their vision to  transform 
the Army, a group of engineers from the Research, Development, and Engineering 
Center, U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) were working on 
the first wearable computer system. This system became known as the Soldier’s 
Computer (see Figures 1 and 2). In 1990, the Soldier’s Computer demonstrated its 
capabilities at the Army Materiel Command’s first trade show in Aberdeen, MD. The 
system weighed 10 pounds and included software that created reports and displayed 
battlefield situation maps. The system interface included a Global Positioning System 
(GPS) receiver and the earliest version of a ruggedized helmet-mounted display. A 
trackball was integrated into the system to allow soldiers to write and send reports to 
other units. The system was a tradeshow success in the eyes of Army leaders and 
Congressional members. This success led the Army to invest further research and 
development in the emerging technology (Zieniewicz, Johnson, Wong, & Flatt, 2002, p. 
30).   
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Figure 1.   The Soldier’s Computer. (From Zieniewicz et al., 2002, p. 35) 
 
 
Figure 2.   The Soldier’s Computer, 1990. (From Zieniewicz et al., 2002, p. 31) 
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The evolution of wearable computers continued as an open system–bus wearable 
design was developed called the Soldier Integrated Protective Ensemble (SIPE) 
Advanced-Technology Demonstration (ATD). The system was developed by the Natick 
Soldier Center in Massachusetts (see Figure 3). A team led by Carol Fitzgerald began the 
process of designing the system that it could capture images, use an integrated radio to 
transmit data between soldiers, and display data with a helmet-mounted portable display 
(Zieniewicz et al., 2002).   
The initial feedback from the soldiers who used the system was positive. The 
Natick team continued their work on a more compact and lighter system. Battery 
consumption was an issue, both in weight and usage. Another issue the team faced was 
the delay in the capture and playback of images. Due to technology limitations at the 
time, the system averaged 45–75 seconds to capture and transmit images. During this 
time-delay, the system could not be used by the soldier (Zieniewicz et al., 2002).   
 
Figure 3.   The SIPE System used in the Soldier’s Computer. (From Zieniewicz et al., 
2002, p. 33) 
As the first step in the evolution of a soldier system, the SIPE exceeded its 
primary objectives, which were to show the technical feasibility of emerging commercial 
technologies and to make tradeoffs until an optimal system configuration was developed. 
The intent of the system was to test a head-to-toe individual fighting system for the 
ground soldier. When tested in an operational environment, dismounted soldiers equipped 
with the SIPE demonstrated significant improvements in their ability to shoot, 
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communicate, and survive. The system configuration was a backpack-sized computer 
with an 18-pound integrated radio and GPS, an 8-pound helmet-mounted display (HMD), 
and a 15-pound power pack. The team did not solve the problem of data delay between 
systems. Despite the limitations in the SIPE’s design, the technology was considered state 
of the art in the early 1990s. The team’s research and development was the first to link 
the individual soldier into a digitized command and control network (Middleton et al., 
2000).   
The success of the SIPE technology focused the Army on their ultimate goal, to 
produce an integrated fighting system. In 1993, Army leadership began development of 
the LW system. The LW system had to be able to shoot, move, and communicate on the 
battlefield, while simultaneously showing the location of friendly and enemy soldiers.  In 
addition, the system had to be easy to use, run seamlessly all day, and be comfortable to 
wear for continuous operations (Zieniewicz et al., 2002).  
The LW system became the first integrated fighting system on the battlefield to 
successfully transmit information from a dismounted leader to subordinates in a digitized 
combat environment. The LW has been scrutinized throughout its tenure for not reaching 
its potential because of technology limitations. To make matters worse, soldiers disliked 
the system because of its weight and the slow response of its communications functions. 
The LW–Manchu system was reduced in weight, glitches in the CPU were repaired, and 
wearability and functionality were improved (TCM–S, 2010). Lastly, the system’s 
success with the 4–9 Manchus during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2007–2008 breathed 
life back into the system that the Department of Defense (DoD) cut from the FY2007 
budget. The system has proved itself useful many times since the return of the Manchus. 
To date, the system has been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, two very different 
theaters of operation, with four separate Stryker brigades.   
B. AN ABBREVIATED HISTORY OF THE NETT WARRIOR SYSTEM  
After nearly 20 years of development and several combat deployments to both 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the LW has evolved into the Nett Warrior, the latest system to 
integrate ground soldiers into a digitized network. The system’s “mission is to provide 
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unparalleled situational awareness (SA) and understanding to the dismounted leader 
(team leader [TL] and above), allowing for faster, more accurate decisions in the tactical 
fight and connecting the dismounted soldier to the lower tactical network” (Beidel, 2010). 
It includes a hands-free display to view information, a computer to process information 
and populate the screen, an interface device for user-screen interaction, a system power 
source, a software operating system for system functionality, tactical applications and 
battle command, and a networked radio transmitter/receiver to send and receive 
information and voice communications (Frenchick, 2011). 
NW has gone through several configuration changes from the once bulky and 
heavy system known as the Land Warrior Initial Capability (LW–IC) system. Initially, 
the system weighed a formidable 41 pounds. Eventually, it was stripped down to 10 
pounds by Stryker soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Division’s 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry 
Regiment (4–9 IN), trained and deployed with the LW–Manchu system from 2006 to 
2008. “Manchu” is the nickname earned by the 4–9 Infantry regiment after they marched 
85 miles across China (from Taku Bar to Tientsin) during the Boxer Rebellion that took 
place in 1900, during China’s Manchu Dynasty (Kramer, 2009).    
Upon redeployment, the LW–Manchu system was transferred to 5/2 SBCT so 
they could conduct familiarization training with the system. 5/2 SBCT received the 
updated version of the LW system just before deploying to Afghanistan and, 
subsequently, renamed it the LW–Strike. The system came in two configurations: the 
7.28-pound TL configuration and the 9.9-pound Squad Leader (SL) configuration.  
Additional upgrades to the LW–Strike system included software corrections to address 
the high number of system failures identified during the Manchu’s deployment, to 
improve the functionality of the navigational subsystem (NSS), and to implement the 
Army’s decision to use a commercial GPS. According to the Office of the Director, 
Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E; 2009), the system was fielded and deployed to 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with 5/2 SBCT in 2009 and redeployed in July 2010.  
In July 2010, 5/2 SBCT transferred their LW–Strike system to the 2nd Stryker Cavalry 
Regiment (SCR) who used it during their yearlong deployment in Afghanistan. When 
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2nd SCR redeployed, they handed the system off to 1st SBCT, 25th Infantry Division (1–
25 SBCT), Fort Wainwright, AK, in November 2010 (Duval, 2010).  
The LW program is unique because in FY2007 the DoD cut the program from its 
budget (DoD, 2007). Based on historical precedent, the program should have ended then. 
As the Manchus were training up to deploy to Iraq as part of President Bush’s “surge” 
effort to fight al-Qaeda’s development of safe havens, the procurement of the system 
halted. The Manchus had integrated the LW system so effectively into their battalion that, 
to change their current techniques, tactics, and procedures would have meant retraining 
an entire battalion well into their deployment. This assessment caused the Senate Armed 
Services Committee to authorize $80 million in funds to equip 4–9 IN and two additional 
battalions. This effort allowed 4/2 SBCT to use the LW system at the brigade level during 
their deployment to Iraq in 2007 (see Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4.   4/2 SBCT Task Organization With LW-Equipped Units. (From TCM–S, 
2008) 
The latest iteration of this system is called the Nett Warrior. Originally known as 
the Ground Soldier Ensemble (GSE), its official name is Ground Soldier System 
Increment I (GSS Inc I; Lopez, 2010). According to the DOT&E (2010), on the Army’s 
birthday in June 2010, the GSE was formally renamed the Nett Warrior in honor of 
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World War II Medal of Honor recipient, Colonel Robert Nett (DOT&E, 2010). The NW 
system is designed to fit under the back flap of the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV) to reduce 
its profile so it is not visible to the enemy. It should add only five additional pounds to 
the OTV’s weight. In addition, the new system has a battery designed to run for 24 hours 
on a four-hour charge. These two new features give this system potential that far exceeds 
that of its LW predecessor (Lopez, 2010). 
C. ORIGINS OF SOLDIER AS A SYSTEM (SAAS) 
TRADOC’s pamphlet 525–97 (2006), discusses the role the individual soldier 
plays on the battlefield:  
[The] individual Soldier remains the ultimate weapon on the battlefield, 
technology enables the [Brigade Combat Team] to understand, shape, 
engage, consolidate, and transition to control and win the next battle. 
Casualties and collateral damage are minimized, while operational success 
is expedited. The individual Soldier is not only a common factor in all 
battlefield functions, but central to future formations in all combat 
environments or scenarios. No battlefield function can occur without 
direct or indirect involvement of Soldiers. The [Soldier as a System] SaaS 
will support all current and future Soldiers, regardless of their role or 
mode of entry into the battle, and once there, will make Soldiers more 
efficient and effective, as well as more lethal and survivable. (p. 18)  
The concept of the SaaS developed as leaders in the Army began to realize that 
there was a lack of integration between soldiers, their equipment, and the Army’s other 
warfighting systems. The Army determined this disconnection was due to a lack of 
information-requirements integration with the combat developers and also to the materiel 
development community’s “lack of configuration, manpower and personnel integration, 
and control of Soldier Items” (TRADOC, 2006, p. 4).  The result was equipment and 
systems that were often bulky and heavy, and that did not effectively meet soldiers’ 
performance needs. Additionally, the Army lacked a holistic view of combat and materiel 
development. Soldiers in MOS (military occupational specialty) jobs that required 
combat, especially Armor and Infantry, received modernized equipment. On the other 
hand, soldiers in combat service support and combat-support MOS jobs did not receive 
the same attention.  The goal of SaaS is to ensure the Army funds a minimum level of 
soldier capability across the Army, not just in the combat arms (TRADOC, 2006, p. 5).  
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To meet this need, the Army established the Program Executive Officer (PEO)–
Soldier at Fort Belvoir, VA, to develop, produce, field, and sustain everything a soldier 
wears and carries.  
PEO–Soldier’s webpage explains their link between soldiers, their equipment, and 
the Army’s systems: 
Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier was created by the Army with 
one primary purpose: to develop the best equipment and field it as quickly 
as possible so that our Soldiers remain second to none in missions that 
span the full spectrum of military operations. … By viewing the Soldier as 
part of an integrated system, PEO Soldier ensures that the Soldier and 
everything he or she wears or carries works together as an integrated 
system. … In this respect, PEO Soldier is at the vanguard of Army 
transformation. (Program Executive Office [PEO] Soldier, 2011) 
PEO–Soldier supports the acquisition of integrated soldier systems like the LW 
and NW programs through the Project Manager Soldier Warrior (PM SWAR). PM 
SWAR’s goal is to “equip Soldiers with the best products the industry has to offer” (PM–
Soldier, 2010). The result is a technologically advanced system that overmatches the 
enemy in terms of range and lethality, while reducing the load on the soldier (PEO–
Soldier, 2011).    
The Army achieves these goals by addressing soldier issues as they relate to 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF). DOTMLPF is a problem-solving construct for assessing current 
capabilities and managing change. Change is achieved through a continuous cycle of 
adaptive innovation, experimentation, and experience. Change that is deliberately 
executed across DOTMLPF elements enables the Army to improve its capabilities to 
provide dominant land power to the joint force (DA, 2005b). 
The TRADOC (2006) PAM 525–97, Soldier as a System, explains:  
Two considerations drive this process—one is threat based, the other 
capability based—to fix unidentified Soldier gaps. Where the Army met or 
exceeded weapons overmatch, based on opposing threat weapons, it based 
its modernization program on technology capabilities to widen its 
advantage. The Soldier is the Army’s most vulnerable asset and is 
susceptible to almost every threat known on the battlefield. The primary 
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consideration for any analysis of the Army’s present Soldier capabilities 
will be based on the threat to the individual Soldier. (p. 19) 
The LW’s sub-meter imagery capabilities and GPS allow LW-equipped soldiers 
to navigate more proficiently. In addition, soldiers are better able to plan, coordinate and 
synchronize maneuvers internally and with adjacent units. LW icons also appear on the 
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) systems of vehicles equipped 
with a vehicle integration kit (VIK).  This allows the unit leadership to track soldiers as 
they move on the ground (TCM–S, 2010). 
C. NETT WARRIOR EMERGES 
Similar to LW, the Nett Warrior (NW) will be composed of a digital radio, a GPS 
beacon, and a wearable computer.  Complete with a faster and more powerful processer 
and an expanded memory for storing maps, imagery, and graphics, NW has incorporated 
technological advances that improve its performance and reduce its weight. In addition to 
software developments and internal improvements, the current Nett Warrior system has 
made significant ergonomic and functionality enhancements. Improvements targeted the 
enhanced Soldier Control Unit (eSCU) by making it a more user-friendly handheld 
controller with push-to-talk buttons and two radio channels, all thumb operated. 
Additional features new to the design are a QWERTY keyboard for text messaging and 
report/orders writing. The battery compartment was enhanced with the ability to carry 
single or dual batteries, allowing for longer mission times between changing out, and the 
use of quick-charging, rechargeable batteries.  The optical display maintains the hands-
free HMD but has an upgraded high-resolution 17-inch monitor equivalent.  
These changes to the design and wearability are results of four years of LW 
deployments to both Iraq and Afghanistan. The latest LW version weighed 10 pounds but 
the NW is said to weigh seven pounds and operate for 24 hours on a single, four-hour 
charged battery.  
PEO–Soldier (2011) discusses how NW will employ a system-of-systems 
approach:  
The NW program will focus on the development of the SA system, which 
has the ability to graphically display the location of an individual leader’s 
location on a digital geo-referenced map image. Additional soldier and 
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leader locations are also displayed on the hands-free digital display. NW is 
connected through a secure radio that will send and receive information 
from one NW to another, thus connecting the dismounted leader to the 
network. These radios will also connect the equipped leader to higher 
echelon data and information products to assist in decision making and 
situational understanding. Soldier position location information will be 
added to the network via interoperability with the Army’s Rifleman Radio 
capability. All of this will allow the leader to easily see, understand, and 
interact in the method that best suits the user and the particular mission. 
(PEO–Soldier, 2011)  
In 2009, the Army awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to three government 
contractors in order to build NW prototypes: General Dynamics, Raytheon, and Rockwell 
Collins (Gould, 2010). Aided by lessons learned from past deployments of LW, each of 
the three contractors developed slightly different systems with unique characteristics.  
However, the main focus of the system down-selection, which was originally scheduled 
for February 2010 but has yet to be executed by the Army, is the improvement of all the 
contractor-furnished property (CFP) components. As illustrated in Figure 5, the 
government provided the contractors the radio, battery, and software which focus them 
more on the technological aspects of the system (DOT&E, 2010). The NW body 
subsystem is designed to fit under the back flap of the IOTV to reduce its profile so it is 
not visible to the enemy as its predecessor, the LW-Strike, illustrated in Figure 6. 
 18 
 
Figure 5.   Nett Warrior Increment 1. (From DOT&E, 2010) 
 
Figure 6.   Land Warrior–Strike 2009, SL Configuration, 9.94 Pounds. (From TCM–S, 
2010) 
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Overall, the NW body subsystem should add only five additional pounds to the 
IOTV’s weight (Lopez, 2010). All three contractors were challenged to deliver a 
prototype that weighs less, uses fewer batteries, and takes up less space on/in the IOTV. 
Throughout the life of the program, excessive weight and battery consumption have been 
the system’s Achilles’ heel. If contractors can overcome these main stumbling blocks it 
would prove a huge victory for the soldier who has to carry it.   
Little is known about the NW system configurations developed by the three 
vendors because they are close hold as competition is ongoing. Figure 7 shows a concept 
as envisioned by Rockwell Collins.  Shown in this picture are the helmet-mounted and 
chest-mounted HMD, the eSCU, and radio on the vest.    
 
Figure 7.   Rockwell Collins Nett Warrior concept. (From Ackerman, 2010) 
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III. NETT WARRIOR USERS’ PERSPECTIVES 
We are right on the cusp of solving some of the limiters that have been 
haunting us since the end of World War Two. Colonel James G. Riley, 
TCM–S (Riley, 2009, p. 7)  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we briefly describe the Army TRADOC Capability Manager’s 
(TCM) role in the acquisition process. We provide details about TCM–Soldier’s (TCM-
S) role in LW’s development, equipping, and deployment.  Also, in this chapter we 
present the outcomes of the 4–9 IN DOTMLPF ITA, the 5/2 SBCT DOTMLPF ITA, and 
other assessments that ultimately contributed to the development of the NW system.   
In the Army’s system acquisition process, the TRADOC Capability Manager, 
Training and Doctrine for the Soldier (TCM–S) is the user’s representative for Nett 
Warrior (NW). TCMs are established to be the user representative during the acquisition 
process.  As the former lead for TCM–Soldier, Colonel Riley completed the majority of 
his TCM-S service during deployment of the 4–9 IN (Manchu), 4/2 SBCT to Iraq in 2008 
and during the preparation phase leading up to 5/2 SBCT’s deployment to Afghanistan in 
2009.   
As the lead for TCM–S, Colonel Riley was an advocate of the Land Warrior 
system and the innovative capabilities it placed in the hands of the ground fighting 
soldier. TCM’s position was that the LW system was an effective combat multiplier.  
Colonel Riley supported the practice of setting the basis-of-issue plan (BOIP) at the TL 
level.  He embraced the notion that every soldier was a sensor capable of making timely 
and prudent decisions. Furthermore, TCM–S felt compelled to ensure that the LW system 
was documented during its first-ever deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.   
Devoted to the mission of documenting how the LW–Manchu system performed 
in combat, Colonel Riley deployed members from TCM–Soldier to conduct a DOTMLPF 
ITA to both theaters of operation, Iraq and Afghanistan.  The purpose of the 2008 4–9 IN 
ITA, was to supplement TRAC–WSMR’s 2007 DOTMLPF assessment that informed the 
Milestone C decision in 2007 (TCM–S, 2008). 
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A year later, TCM–Soldier deployed to Afghanistan to conduct a subsequent 
supplementary analysis of the LW–Strike system’s performance in Afghanistan while 
deployed by 5/2 SBCT “Strike” Brigade. Based on the results of both DOTMLPF ITAs, 
TCM–Soldier concluded that the LW–Manchu system effectively mitigated 17 of the 19 
small-unit capability gaps identified by the United States Army Infantry Center (USAIC) 
and TRAC–WSMR in the 2007 LW–Manchu Phase I Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).  
These gaps were identified during the functional needs analysis, based on a combination 
of operational lessons learned, USAIC student surveys, subject matter expert input, and 
experimental results. The results of the ITAs also concluded that the LW–Manchu system 
enabled leaders with precise navigation, mitigated fratricide, and allowed for the use of 
collaborative and more sophisticated tactics, such as the application of the digital 
chemlights (TCM–S, 2008).  Below is a comment from one of the soldiers in 4–9 IN on 
the chemlight capability: 
The digital chemlight enabled leaders to display precise locations for 
direct and indirect fires while synchronizing movements of LW units.  The 
digital chemlight was often used to designate waypoints and points of 
interest while on the move.  LW lessens the burden upon subordinate 
leaders to periodically report their locations to higher headquarters, thus 
allowing leaders to focus on controlling their elements.  The qualitative 
surveys demonstrated leaders were more actively controlling their units. 
(TSM–S, 2008, p. 6–2)   
B. TRADOC CAPABILITY MANAGER–SOLDIER  
In accordance with the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission, Fort 
Benning, GA, serves as the United States Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence 
(MCoE).  The mission of the MCoE is to provide the nation with the world's best trained 
Infantry, Armor, and Cavalry soldiers.  In addition to developing adaptive leaders 
instilled with the warrior ethos, Fort Benning serves as the home of TCM–Soldier (TCM–
S, 2010).  TCM–S serves as the representative for the user community regarding anything 
that the soldier uses, is equipped with, or comes into contact with.  
According to the TCM–S’s website, their mission is as follows:  
….to ensure modernization of the Soldier as a system of systems with the 
best possible equipment and associated doctrine, training, leader 
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development and fighting organization to fight and win in the 
contemporary operating environment.  TCM–Soldier is the user’s 
representative and the conscience of the Army for the Soldier—all 
Soldiers —within Army formations; and ensures DOTMLPF integration 
of Soldier capabilities across and within Army formations (TCM–S, 
2011).  
The organizational chart for TCM–S is depicted in Figure 8. It shows the areas of 
emphasis regarding the soldier’s requirements.  
 
 
Figure 8.   TRADOC Capability Manager–Soldier Organizational Chart. (From TCM–S, 
2011) 
C. TCM–SOLDIER AND SAAS 
While the Armor Center and Army Aviation Center focused on the development 
of the Mounted Soldier System and the Air Soldier System, respectively, TCM–Soldier 
focuses on the needs of the core and ground soldier systems. These efforts support the 
philosophy that the soldier’s equipment should be modular in order to meet mission 
requirements.  
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In their 2011 resolutions, the Association of the United States Army details the 
Soldier as a System concept in their legislative agenda titled 11–15 Soldier 
Modernization: 
Soldier as a System (SaaS) takes a systems engineering approach that is 
integrated, and provides a modular solution. SaaS integrates more than 
400 unique items of equipment, providing increased combat effectiveness 
for our Land, Mounted and Air Warriors while reducing size, weight, and 
power requirements. The modern battlefield requires this integrated and 
packaged approach to improve the individual Soldier’s lethality, 
survivability, command and control, situational awareness, sustainability, 
mobility, and combat effectiveness.  Critical elements include: the Soldier 
Enhancement Program (SEP) and the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) for 
the near-term non-developmental items; modular improvements for mid-
term solutions; and Nett Warrior, Air and Mounted Soldier programs for 
the long-term solutions. (Association of the United States Army [AUSA], 
2010, p. 1)   
In Figure 9, the four components concerning the SaaS Strategy for Modernization 
are depicted.     
 
Figure 9.   Soldier as a System Strategy for Soldier Modernization. (From TCM–S, 2010) 
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As first mentioned in Chapter II, the purpose of the SaaS concept is to support the 
Army’s vision that soldiers remain the centerpiece of our combat systems and formations. 
The Army’s vision statement further supports the idea that soldiers should remain the 
crucial link to both realizing Future Combat Systems (FCS) capabilities and enhancing 
the effectiveness of current forces (TRADOC, 2006). 
In S. L. A. Marshall’s The Soldier’s Load and Mobility of a Nation, we see the 
importance of identifying the complete soldier and defining those systems in concert in 
order to ultimately increase the soldier’s overall effectiveness and efficiency. From 
World War I through Vietnam, the soldier’s load did not change significantly in terms of 
weight.  Only gradually have items been improved or made of lighter materiel, as in the 
Vietnam-era load bearing equipment. As technology continues to improve, so does our 
threat to national security, and in spite of using lighter materials to manufacture personal 
equipment, battlefield requirements have continued to grow, often causing the soldier’s 
load to exceed 100 pounds.  
In keeping with the 1991 ASB Summer Study that identified the need for the 
Army to manage the soldier’s load, the SaaS Integrated Concept Team (ICT) continues to 
refine soldier requirements.  Designated by TRADOC, MCoE at Fort Benning, GA, is the 
proponent for SaaS and the concept development within the DOTMLPF framework. 
TCM–Soldier has taken a holistic approach to the requirements. The TCM-S underlying 
approach was to equip the soldier modularly with the equipment that best suited the needs 
of the mission (Lockhart, 2006). 
D. TRADOC CAPABILITY MANAGER–SOLDIER & NW DEVELOPMENT 
TCM–Soldier has a long history of serving as a steadfast proponent for the LW 
and NW Programs.  Under the guidance of HQDA and the MCoE, the materiel developer 
and TCM-S have pursued dismounted battle command systems to fill the operational 
capability gaps of the ground fighting soldier. Although several similar systems have 
been developed, TCM–Soldier’s position has been that the NW and LW systems were 
most capable of filling the ground soldier’s 19 capability gaps (TCM–S, 2010).  
 26 
Within the past decade, several systems have been developed that provide 
capabilities similar to those of the LW. In 2003, due to concerns surrounding the cost and 
reliability of the LW system, the Army explored alternative materiel solutions. During 
that year, General Dynamic’s subsidiary, GDC4S developed a prototype called the 
Dismounted Battle Command System (DBCS).  DBCS was a handheld device, similar to 
today’s tablets, and it met most of the LW–Manchu requirements. Unlike the LW–
Manchu, it was leadership-focused instead of soldier-focused. At that time, Colonel Ernie 
Forrest from TCM–Soldier voiced his concerns about the BDCS. He wanted to focus on 
the LW–Manchu–based capabilities, such as lethality, the weapon subsystem (WSS), and 
the basis of issue (BOI; Clifton & Copeland, 2008). 
This direction was also more aligned with Joint Vision 2020, specifically, its 
recommendation that the Services “…have the embedded technologies and adaptive 
organizational structures that will allow trained and experienced people to develop 
compatible processes and procedures, engage in collaborative planning, and adapt as 
necessary to specific crisis situations” (J5, 2000). The LW–Manchu system and the 
DBCS both provided information superiority beyond the capability of unequipped 
soldiers, allowing for dominant maneuverability on the battlefield. TCM–Soldier’s stance 
was that the LW–Manchu system allowed soldiers’ hands to remain on their weapons, 
adding lethality and force protection measures to the equation (Clifton & Copeland, 
2008).  In addition to the DBCS, several other options were developed. However, the LW 
and NW remained TCM’s systems of choice because they continued to be the systems 
most capable of fulfilling the ground soldiers’ requirements. 
E. LAND WARRIOR AND THE 4–9 INFANTRY IN IRAQ 
In April 2007, the 4/2 SBCT had the distinction of being the first Stryker brigade 
to deploy with all ten Stryker variants as part of the surge.  For the next 15 months, the 4–
9 IN operated out of Camp Taji while conducting full-spectrum operations aided by the 
LW–Manchu.  During the first 12 months of 4–9 IN’s deployment, TCM–Soldier 
conducted a DOTMLPF ITA of the 4–9 IN’s application of the LW–Manchu system.  
The purpose of TCM–Soldier’s ITA was to supplement findings in the 2007 TRAC–
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WSMR Land Warrior (LW)/Mounted Warrior (MW) DOTMLPF assessment. The results 
of this report would inform the March 2007 LW–Manchu Milestone C decision (TCM–S, 
2008).   
According to the October 2008 ITA report, TCM–Soldier’s analysis found that 
equipping the 4–9 IN with LW–Manchu down to the team leader (TL) level greatly 
enhanced their force effectiveness in terms of mission success, lethality, and operational 
tempo. The rifle team is the smallest maneuver element in the fight. While equipped 
down to the team leader with the LW–Manchu system, the 4–9 IN captured twice as 
many targets as any other battalion within the brigade, equating to 48% of the brigade’s 
total. These results are illustrated in Figures 10 and 11. LW–Manchu-equipped mission 
times were reduced by 26% compared to non-LW equipped units during time sensitive 
target (TST) missions. LW–Manchu enabled precise navigation, fratricide mitigation, 
collaborative operations, and the advent of digital chemlights and breadcrumbing. Both 
of these tactics allowed for greater situational awareness and faster decision-making up 
and down the chain of command (TCM–S, 2008).    
 





Figure 11.   Percentage of Total HVIs by LW–Manchu–Equipped Units. (From TCM–S, 
2008) 
The soldiers in the 4–9 IN greatly benefitted from the robust EPLRS network 
organic to the Stryker brigade. Equipped with a vehicle integration kit (VIK), the Stryker 
vehicles accurately tracked the locations of dismounted LW–Manchu systems on the 
battlefield and coordinated maneuvers that effectively supported dismounted squads.  The 
enhanced SA afforded the Stryker mounted elements better coordination in supporting 
the efforts of their dismounted soldiers. For the first time in an operational setting, 
mounted ground forces had real-time SA of the location of friendly forces on the 
battlefield.  “A LW vehicle integration kit (VIK) was installed on all Stryker vehicles 
carrying LW equipped Soldiers to provide connection to the lower tactical internet (LTI) 
and [a] battery recharger. The VIK comprised a battery charger, a battery storage unit, 
and a vehicle gateway” (TCM–S, 2008, p. 1–5). 
While equipped with the LW–Manchu system, the 4–9 IN performed a variety of 
operations, including serving as the brigade’s primary high value target (HVT) raid team. 
Although many of the operations the 4–9 IN conducted in Iraq allowed for mutually 
supporting efforts between dismounted and mounted operations, the Manchus also 
performed air assault missions during some of their HVT raids. Aided by enhanced SA 
and precise navigation, the LW–Manchu–equipped soldiers maneuvered with more 
confidence and speed on the unfamiliar terrain that is often associated with HVT raids. 
“Land Warrior [Manchu] gave me confidence as I planned to coordinate for a blind hit at 
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night for the first time in this area,” said the 4–9 IN Fire Support Officer, who used the 
LW–Manchu with the 4th BN (PEO–Soldier, 2009). 
In a June 2009 article in Soldier Modernisation, Colonel Riley, former TCM–S, 
stated that the LW–Manchu’s enhanced capabilities allowed fire team leaders to make 
better informed decisions:  
We are going to give fire team leaders Situational Awareness (SA). Within 
that, the fire team leaders have a display which shows [them] maps and 
imagery to give [them] an idea of what’s going on. Every leader starts by 
asking some very basic questions. The first is “Where am I?” It is pretty 
significant to know where you are. However, that didn’t come out much in 
training; in fact we never saw it to be that big a deal in test and evaluation. 
Nevertheless, once you get into unknown country and [it’s] dark out, 
knowing exactly where you are at any one moment is pretty important. 
(Riley, 2009, p. 7)  
Colonel Riley’s position was that the LW–Manchu system provided unparalleled 
enhancements to the ground fighting soldier in terms of SA, precise navigation, and 
improved battle command.   
After 12 months of observation during the 4–9 IN ITA, TCM–Soldier (2008) 
noted that the enhanced force effectiveness of the LW–Manchu system was remarkable. 
The LW–Manchu system allowed 4–9 IN leaders to make better informed battlefield 
decisions and to rapidly and clearly direct the actions of their subordinates. As a result, 
those subordinates responded more quickly than their adversaries and dominated the 
small unit counter-insurgency fight (TCM–S, 2008).  
Another observation indicated the power of digital chemlights, digital icons that 
LW–Manchu users can populate and label for other users to see. The soldiers of 4–9 IN 
developed a standard operating procedure (SOP) for the use of the four different-colored 
digital chemlights and were creative in applying this new feature. Soldiers from 4–9 IN 
also used the digital chemlight to generate a grid system for searching open fields.  In 
addition, they used the digital chemlight to mark suspected or known enemy positions 
(TCM–S, 2008). 
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In Colonel Riley’s quote (2009), he provides an example of how the digital 
chemlight allowed ground and mounted forces to exploit their enhanced SA. 
A squad entered the objective and took fire from a sniper location. They 
quickly marked that point with the digital chemlight which focused the 
[organization] on that location. Their Stryker vehicle knew that, even 
though they didn’t have a field of fire. That C2 piece for small unit leaders 
allows you [team leader] to focus combat power very quickly (p. 8).  
In addition to marking buildings, digital chemlights were used as a grid reference 
system. Figure 12 shows Objective (OBJ) Taft, a clearance operation in OIF the 4–9 IN 
conducted. As you can see in the illustration, two squads cleared a palm grove searching 
for hidden caches of weapons and IED-making devices. An advantage to this grid 
reference system was that the leadership were able to follow the squad’s progress without 
being updated by the leadership. This technique facilitates stealth movement, aiding noise 
and light discipline (T. Qualls, personal communication, July 28, 2011). 
 
Figure 12.   Objective Taft, Clearance Operation. (From Qualls, 2011)2 
                                                 
2 Lieutenant Colonel Ted Qualls, Assistant TCM–Soldier, provided the vignette for OBJ Taft to 
illustrate the digital grid reference SOP developed by the 4–9 IN. 
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F. LW–STRIKE AND 5/2 SBCT IN AFGHANISTAN 
After the 4–9 IN redeployed from Iraq, a majority of their LW–Manchu systems 
were sent to the 5/2 SBCT to begin familiarization training in October 2008.  Equipped 
with 100 LW–Manchu systems, the brigade rotated squads through STX lanes from 
October–December 2008.  Following the three months of familiarization training, the 5/2 
SBCT executed their National Training Center (NTC) rotation in January 2009. During 
their NTC rotation, one company per battalion was equipped with the LW–Manchu 
system.  Due to factors beyond the control of the unit and the PM, the 5/2 SBCT finally 
received their LW–Strike systems in May 2009, two months prior to their deployment to 
Afghanistan.  With only two months to conduct NET, the unit had a compressed timeline 
to conduct final training and pre-deployment activities (W. Hiatt, personal 
communication, October 22, 2011). 
In July 2009, the 5/2 SBCT earned two distinctions.  The 5/2 SBCT was the first 
Stryker brigade to deploy to Afghanistan. Second, it was the first LW-equipped unit in 
Afghanistan. The 5/2 SBCT received an updated LW system, referred to as the LW–
Strike system in honor of their brigade.  The LW–Strike system was modified from its 
predecessor based on user feedback from 4–9 IN. The system came in two 
configurations, the 7.28-pound TL configuration and the 9.9-pound SL configuration. 
Upgrades to the system included software corrections to address the high number of 
system failures identified during the Manchu’s deployment, a NSS, a text pad on the 
soldier control unit, a Peltor noise-cancelling headset with a band behind the neck as 
opposed to over the crown of the head, and a commercial GPS (TCM–S, 2010).   
In August 2009, TCM–Soldier deployed a team to Afghanistan to conduct an ITA 
with the 5/2 SBCT. The 5/2 ITA spanned from August 2009 to March 2010, as shown in 
Figure 13. The purpose of the 5/2 ITA was to observe the impacts of the LW–Strike 
system in Afghanistan and to supplement the findings of the 4–9 IN ITA. During the 5/2 
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Figure 13.   Land Warrior Assessment Team Timeline, 2009/2010. (From TCM–S, 2010) 
After conducted familiarization training with the 4–9 IN Manchu systems, 
completing a mission-ready exercise (MRE) at the National Training Center with the 
LW–Manchu systems, and conducting  NET with the LW–Strike systems, TCM–Soldier 
initially thought that 5/2 SBCT was adequately prepared for its deployment to 
Afghanistan (TCM–S, 2010). However, two surveys conducted by the MBL during the 
deployment revealed that 5/2 SBCT had inadequate opportunities to conduct collective 
training with their newer LW systems due to time constraints. 
According to the Maneuver Battle Lab the 5/2 SBCT lacked sufficient training 
opportunities to develop user acceptance and proficiency prior to deploying: 
New equipment training was sufficient to introduce the unit to the LW 
system. However, Soldiers did not receive an opportunity to embrace the 
added capabilities prior to deploying. After NET, there were no further 
opportunities to collectively exercise the system and embrace the 
enhanced capabilities. Prior to the MBL survey, TCM–S assumed there 
would be a learning curve with user acceptance and proficiency with 
applying functions. Between the two surveys (October 2009 and March 
2010), the MBL concluded that user acceptance and proficiency with the 
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system improved with additional time using the system. The ITA revealed 
that during the initial survey, LW users reported that LW most impacted 
two tasks: navigation and understanding friendly locations. Surveys 
concluded that user acceptance and proficiency with the LW–Strike 
system is directly related to the amount of time Soldiers have to apply the 
system in collective exercises. Not having ample opportunity to conduct 
collective exercises with the system prior to entering into combat 
operations affected user acceptance and proficiency to apply the system. 
(TCM–S, 2010, p. 2–2)  
Once in Afghanistan, TCM–Soldier observed how each battalion operated in a 
different manner according to the threat and terrain. Some battalions operated more in the 
manner of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) in which Stryker vehicles are not 
employed to mutually support the dismounted maneuvering elements. These battalions 
used this method because they needed to be stealthier or more compliant to concessions 
made with local village leaders. Other battalions performed more in the manner of 
traditional cavalry screening operations and did not dismount as often because they 
needed long-range surveillance and maneuverability over vast expanses of terrain (TCM–
S, 2010).   
Although reaping the benefits of enhanced SA, LW–Strike–equipped units faced 
other challenges with the system. For example, the system’s weight and power 
requirements continued to pose significant challenges in the daily operations of each of 
the battalions within the brigade. Depending on the battalion’s area of operation, the 
terrain in Afghanistan varied from mountainous with extreme elevation changes, to wide 
open desert, to dense orchards, such as those found in the Argandab valley.  It was not 
uncommon for soldiers from various battalions to operate in a more traditional IBCT role, 
often operating for days without resupply. Soldiers would have to plan for several days’ 
worth of supplies, including LW batteries. The added weight of the LW–Strike system 
(7.2 pounds), plus the additional weight of the batteries, required for a three-day 
operation (3 days x 3 batteries/day x 2.2 pounds/LI-145 battery) was a significant burden 
to the soldier (TCM–S, 2010). 
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The 5/2 SBCT ITA (2010) discusses how soldiers experimented with the LW-
Strike’s configuration in order to tailor the system to the operational requirements 
specific to each battalion: 
Three of the four battalions experimented with alternate configurations for 
the LW system. Normally, storing the LW system in the IOTV reduced the 
sitting area of Soldiers by two inches, adding to their discomfort by 
forcing them to sit at the edges of their seats. Soldiers were also unable to 
drop down in the Stryker hatches while wearing the LW system in the 
back of the IOTV with ammunition attached. Soldiers adopted several 
alternate methods for wearing the system: 1) the assault bag configuration 
using [a] [Camelbak] (4–23), the [IFAK] (1–17), and a pouch that easily 
attaches/detaches to the outside rear of the IOTV (2–1) and 2) a palm pilot 
that can easily be stored in the ACU shoulder pocket, hangs the HMD 
from the chest and has the ability to invert the image to quickly view the 
screen; and a “quarterback” wrist display. (TCM–S, 2010, p. 4–5)  
Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry (1–17 IN) developed a condensed 
configuration by storing the LW–Strike in an Improved First Aid Kit (IFAK), as shown 
in Figure 14. This allowed the soldiers to carry the LW–Strike system in various 
locations on their IOTV.   
 
Figure 14.   Improved First Aid Kit (IFAK) Configuration Observed at 1-17 IN. (From 
TCM–S, 2010) 
Alternatively, soldiers from 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment (8–1 CAV) and 
2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment (2–1 IN) utilized a separate CamelBak bag to house 
the LW–Strike system in an assault bag configuration. By housing the LW–Strike system 
in an assault bag, the soldiers were able to move more freely within the Stryker vehicles 
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and in some of the tight hatch openings. Prior to dismounting vehicles, soldiers simply 
grabbed their assault bag and executed the mission. The assault bag configuration also 
allowed soldiers to quickly detach the LW–Strike system prior to climbing over tall 
walls, some in excess of 14 feet. Vehicle commanders also benefitted from the assault 
bag configuration, because the system’s capabilities were adapted for mounted operations 
(TCM–S, 2010). 
TSM–Soldier also observed that the soldiers, most notably 8–1 CAV, adapted the 
LW–Strike system’s HMD, worn by vehicle commanders, to meet mission needs. 
Leaders routinely reported that the LW–Strike system had a faster refresh rate than the 
BLUFORCE tracker system that is mounted in the Stryker vehicles. Utilizing the LW–
Strike system in an assault bag configuration, vehicle commanders were better able to 
maneuver their Stryker vehicles due to the faster refresh rate and HMD. Vehicle 
commanders attached the assault bag that contained the LW–Strike system to the hull of 
the vehicle. The HMD from the LW–Strike system was then attached to the combat 
vehicle crewman (CVC) helmet, which allowed for commanders to stay in the hatch. This 
mitigated the requirement for commanders to drop down in the vehicle in order to get an 
update on their location and the operational environment (TCM–S, 2010). 
Although not condoned by TCM–Soldier, a technique to conserve battery power 
was observed by one battalion. With this battery-conservation technique, a designated TL 
did not power up his LW–Strike system in order to allow the SL to use the extra batteries. 
This technique presented several significant drawbacks.  First, by not powering up all the 
available LW–Strike systems, the unit produced a less robust EPLRS network. Next, by 
not having all systems fully operational, leaders did not possess full awareness of friendly 
elements during the operation. Finally, the TL carried the additional weight of the system 
and extra batteries without benefiting from any of the system’s technological capabilities 
(TCM–S, 2010). 
Some soldiers modified how the system was employed, which was one of the 
other strengths noted by TCM–Soldier: The LW–Strike system maintained enough 
flexibility to conform to the user’s preferences. For example, 4–9 IN modified the 
original configuration that attached the system to the soldier’s waist. Instead, the 
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Manchus moved the system onto the back plate of the IOTV, which concealed the 
components and allowed for improved fit and functionality.  We find it interesting that 
Colonel Cumming’s quote in a June 2009 Soldier Modernization article accurately 
predicted 5/2 SBCT’s modifications to how soldiers would wear the system. 
Fundamentally driven by continuous feedback from soldiers, changes to the LW system 
resulted in the development of a suite of options. According to PM LW, “If you look at 
nine Soldiers, every one of those nine will carry their kit a different way which fits their 
unique requirements for how they do things and based off their form, fit, function, and 
feel” (Cummings, 2009, p.8).   
Some soldiers from 5/2 SBCT demonstrated their dislike towards the Peltor 
headsets of the LW–Strike. 4–9 IN was given a choice between Quiet Pro in-ear devices 
and Peltor headsets, but 5/2 SBCT received only the Peltor headsets. The Peltor headsets 
provided sound amplification as well as noise cancellation. Soldiers often reported their 
general dislike of the Peltor headsets.  Overwhelmingly, soldiers reported discomfort and 
other problems caused by the Peltor headsets.  The four major concerns were as follows:  
The Peltor headsets completely cupped their ears, causing increased 
discomfort from excessive sweating during the extreme heat of 
Afghanistan. Even during the winter months, Soldiers did not use the 
headsets. They were unable to employ the [cognitive radio network] 
CNRS digital radio of the LW Strike system. Ambient noise amplification 
was overwhelming while they maneuvered through areas with fallen 
brush. They were unable to locate the origin of sounds. (TCM–S, 2010, p. 
4–5) 
Overall, the Peltor headset was not well received by 5/2 SBCT soldiers in either 
hot or cold climates. Having no other headset options, soldiers either accepted the Peltors 
or chose not to wear them, forgoing the use of the CNRS digital radio as well (TCM–S, 
2010). 
After nearly nine months of observations of 5/2, TCM–Soldier confirmed the 
2008 4–9 IN ITA’s findings concerning the small unit capability gap. The 2010 5/2 
SBCT ITA concluded that the LW–Strike system “filled or mitigated 17 of the 19 small 
unit capability gaps. All 13 leader tasks contained in the 19 unit capability gaps were 
filled or mitigated by LW [Strike]” (TCM–S, 2010, p. 6–1). This outcome is not 
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surprising considering the similarities between the LW–Manchu and the LW–Strike 
systems. Figure 15 shows a side-by-side comparison of the ITA small unit capability gaps 
assessment of the LW–Manchu and LW–Strike systems.  
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Figure 15.   LW–Manchu and LW–Strike Capability Gaps Assessment. (From TCM–S, 
2010) 
In summary, the 5/2 SBCT ITA confirmed the 4–9 ITA’s findings that LW filled 
or mitigated the majority of the small unit capability gaps. The ITA assessment team 
reported that “Land Warrior [Strike] dramatically improved SA especially with recent, 
sub-meter imagery. Land Warrior [Strike] provided real-time updates of friendly and 
threat locations using standard military and user defined symbols, and operational 
graphics, geo-referenced to maps and/or imagery” (TCM–S, 2010, p. 6–2).  
Although each battalion displayed their own varied levels of acceptance and 
developed unique carrying configurations, the LW system displayed its potential to be a 
feasible materiel solution in filling the small unit capability gaps. Ultimately, TCM–
Soldier contended that leaders made better informed decisions and executed tasks more 
efficiently while sharing a common operation picture (COP) though the use of the LW 
system (TCM–S, 2010). 
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G. 2ND STRYKER CAVALRY REGIMENT AND LW–STRIKE 
In July 2010, the 5/2 SBCT transferred the LW–Strike systems to the 2nd Stryker 
Cavalry Regiment (2SCR), also known as the “Dragoons,” during an in-theater relief in 
place (RIP). The 2SCR then used the LW-Strike system during their year-long 
deployment in Afghanistan. The 2SCR conducted missions similar to the 5/2 SBCT’s 
missions in the southern region of Afghanistan, centered on Kandahar. However, during 
this deployment, TCM–Soldier did not conduct an ITA. Instead, TCM–Soldier refocused 
their attention on the development of the next increment of the LW system, called the 
NW Increment I3 (Geddes, 2011). 
Upon the unit’s redeployment from Afghanistan, TCM–SBCT and TCM–S 
conducted a post-deployment survey of 2SCR in Vilseck, Germany, July 11–15, 2011. 
The purpose of the post-deployment survey was to collect data and feedback on a variety 
of equipment utilized in Afghanistan, including the LW–Strike system. TCM–SBCT and 
TCM–Soldier both received similar comments during their DOTMLPF assessment of the 
2SCR.  No significant changes were reported regarding doctrine and organization.  
However, the 2SCR reported two shortcomings in the areas of training and materiel. In 
regards to training, the 2SCR reported “not receiving adequate training time on the LW–
Strike system. Some units were able to use the system during the mission readiness 
exercise (MRE) but they were the fortunate ones. Other 2SCR squadrons reportedly had 
four days of instruction prior to deployment” (Maneuver Center of Excellence [MCoE], 
2011a).  Other soldiers reported receiving no training at all prior to deploying—requiring 
training in theater to familiarize them with the system (MCoE, 2011b).  
Inadequate training time and opportunities continue to be a recurring trend. In 
July 2009, Dr. Jean Dyer and Jennifer Tucker of the Army Research Institute (ARI) 
identified this problem in their report Training Analyses Supporting the LW and Ground 
Soldier Systems (Dyer, 2009). Dyer and Tucker reported that the LW–Manchu NET 
conducted for the 4–9 IN was assessed to be inadequate. Individuals reported that the 
NET was insufficient in terms of time, tasks addressed, training strategy, and method. 
                                                 
3 We will refer to the NW Increment I as NW for simplicity for the duration of the paper.   
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Consequently, individuals were not fully trained to operate, maintain, and employ the 
system. The ARI’s analysis recommended that company training time should double, 
increasing from nine days to 18 days. The new 18-day training schedule would include a 
collective training phase (Dyer, 2009).  
Many of the ARI’s findings were incorporated in the new training objective for 
the LW–Strike. Similar to the 5/2 SBCT’s time constraints, the 2SCR could not 
implement the lengthy company training timeline due to lack of available time on an 
already full pre-deployment training schedule. Under ideal circumstances, the 2SCR 
would have received an adequate supply of LW–Strike systems six months prior to their 
deployment. This would have allowed the unit to use the system during pre-deployment 
training events and, more importantly, during their MRE and increase unit buy-in 
(MCoE, 2011a).   
Colonel Riggins, PEO–Soldier, understands this comment more than anyone. 
Here are his comments in reference to training on the system:  
One thing we found was, this [LW] is not just something you hang on a 
Soldier and say, “Go ahead and fight,” because it truly changes the basic 
methodology of how you fight, how you command and control and how 
you share information. (Gould, 2010)   
The Dragoons of 2SCR never received training six months prior to deployment. 
At that time, 5/2 ID was still conducting combat operations in Afghanistan and limited 
quantities of the LW–Manchu system were available for use. The LW system is a leader-
intensive piece of equipment that requires the concerted effort of any unit and its leaders 
to conduct NET. Because the 2SCR did not have enough systems to go around, training 
was slow and the Dragoons did not realize the unit buy-in they originally envisioned.   
In terms of materiel, TCM–S reported that only one squadron effectively used 
LW–Strike during their deployment. However, the units that did not use the LW–Strike 
system still desired the SA and battle command capability at the SL and TL levels 
(MCoE, 2011b). TCM–SBCT received a comment of note regarding lethality of an 
Infantry squad. One leader commented that carrying more equipment will not make the 
unit more lethal: “All this gear just slows us down” (MCoE, 2011a, p. 2).  Reinforcing 
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this leader’s message, the 2SCR’s concerns regarding lethality and effectiveness also 
focused primarily on the soldier’s load: “Adding more capability equals adding more 
weight.  Until Soldier load has been reduced, any additional capability added must be 
careful[ly] measured to determine whether it is worth the increased weight” (MCoE, 
2011a, p. 2).  This remark has been echoed throughout TCM–Soldier, sending a clear 
message that “every ounce counts.” In addition to the LW–Strike system, soldiers in 
Afghanistan carried all of their other required personal protective equipment. This added 
weight and capability took a heavy toll on soldiers’ endurance.  
The 2SCR’s comments centered heavily on LW–Strike’s ability—or inability—to 
establish a robust EPLRS mesh network, depending upon the type of missions being 
performed.  TCM–S received comments supporting the effective use of the LW–Strike 
system during dismounted missions of short duration and within a few kilometers of 
EPLRS-equipped Stryker vehicles.   
Overall, similar comments were obtained from TCM–SBCT and TCM–S: 
Soldiers from the 2SCR were concerned with the overall soldier load and how the added 
capabilities increased the weight carried (MCoE, 2011b).  
In order to suit their combat operational needs in Afghanistan, the 2SCR 
conducted a weight-to-capability analysis. The 2SCR’s prevailing recommendation was 
to reduce the overall weight of the soldier load. The Dragoons wanted a more practical 
and portable system and felt the LW–Strike system just needed more refining (W. Hiatt, 
personal communication, October 22, 2011). 
However, this does not mean that all of the soldiers disliked the LW–Strike 
system; instead, their responses to the system were highly mission specific. Captain 
Simone Wood, TCM–SBCT, noted the following in page 4 of her 2SCR lessons learned 
report:  
Feedback received about the Land Warrior system [Strike] was extremely 
dependent on where the unit was operating and what their mission set was. 
Units operating in static positions or in urban areas gave generally positive 
feedback, as they were able to get a good EPLRS signal, which allowed 
them to utilize the system fully. Units in rural, remote or mountainous 
regions had almost nothing good to say about it. (MCoE, 2011a, p. 4)  
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The 2SCR redeployed and transferred the system to 1/25 SBCT, Fort Wainwright, 
AK in November 2010. As of this writing, the 1/25 SBCT is conducting combat 
operations in Afghanistan and there is no available feedback on their use of the LW-
Strike (T. Qualls, personal communication, July 28, 2011).  
H. MANEUVER BATTLE LAB FINDINGS FROM LIMITED OBJECTIVE 
EXPERIMENT 2009 
In 2008, the Army planned to begin fielding IBCT with the NW integrated with a 
Rifleman Radio (RR) capability in FY2012.  In support of a directive from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to update the AoA for NW, TRAC–WSMR recruited the 
support of the Maneuver Battle Lab (MBL) to conduct an LW Limited Objective 
Experiment (LOE) from January 5–March 20, 2009, at Fort Benning, GA. The purpose of 
the 2009 LOE was to assess the effectiveness of an Infantry small unit equipped with a 
surrogate for the NW capability, the LW–Manchu system. The LW–Manchu was used 
because it provided many of the NW capabilities (Maneuver Battle Lab [MBL], 2009). 
The OSD was interested in comparing the operational effectiveness and life cycle 
costs of three alternative BOIPs to inform a NW Milestone B/C decision that was 
scheduled for the second quarter of FY2011. The LW–Manchu system served as the 
surrogate for the NW Inc I,4 the NW integrated with an RR capability. The following list 
identifies the three alternative BOIPs tested: 
• Base case: as a currently equipped unit with its modified tables of organizational 
equipment and rapid fielding initiative equipment; 
• SL BOIP: NW distributed to the SL level and all others equipped with an RR 
capability (use of the LW–Manchu system minus the helmet-mounted display 
(HMD); and 
• TL BOIP: NW distributed to the TL level; all others equipped with an RR 
capability. 
The MBL developed five force-on-force mission sets for the LOE with the 
coordination of the World Class Blue Force (WCBF), the TRADOC Intelligence Support 
                                                 
4 For the purpose of the 2009 LW LOE, the LW–Manchu system was used as a surrogate to the NW 
system.  The NW system was not developed at the time of this experiment. 
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Activity (TRISA), and one IBCT rifle platoon from the TRADOC Experimentation Force 
(EXFOR; MBL, 2009). In preparation for the LOE, the EXFOR conducted two months of 
training in order to develop their proficiency as a currently equipped unit and with the 
LW system. The LOE called for each mission to be executed three times while equipped 
with each alternative BOIP. The LW–Manchu LOE informed three of the five study 
issues:   
• Study Issue 1: How does each alternative contribute to force effectiveness (FE)? 
• Study Issue 2: What is the preferred distribution (BOIP) of NW in an IBCT? 
• Study Issue 5: Validate the operational KPP and Key System Attributes (KSA) 
threshold values.5 
As mentioned by the MBL, one limitation of the study was the LOE’s lack of a 
robust communications network. In order to mitigate the effects of this lack of a reliable 
network during the experiment, four Stryker Infantry carrier vehicles (ICVs) were 
integrated with LW–Manchu and their EPLRS radios. These vehicles served to increase 
the range and reliability of the EPLRS network. Although these vehicles are not organic 
to a typical IBCT, they were incorporated into the evaluation for the sake of establishing 
a more robust network (MBL, 2009).  
1. Summary of Findings 
While reducing survivability, the 2009 LW–Manchu LOE revealed that NW 
capability increased a unit’s force effectiveness in two of the three areas: mission success 
rating and lethality. The EXFOR operated more dispersed and effectively synchronized 
their movement prior to making contact. The MBL concluded that these factors set the 
conditions for successful actions on contact. We find it interesting to note that the SL 
BOIP yielded higher ratings than the TL BOIP. Conversely, the TL BOIP displayed the 
lowest survivability rating, as shown in Table 1. 
                                                 








Base Case SL BOIP TL BOIP
45.4 59.6 47.4
Contribution to Elements FE by GSE BOIP Level
Element of FE BOIP
 
Table 1.   BOIP Performance Across the Elements of Force Effectiveness (FE). (From 
MBL, 2009) 
Furthermore, the NW capability alleviated some of the leadership burden, and 
provided leaders with the information they needed to issue successful orders.  “The most 
noticeable contribution to C2 was related to leaders issuing successful directives. When 
equipped with LW at their level, SLs issued directives with a 98% success rate and TLs 
with a 100% success rate.  Leaders stated that shared SA between TLs and SLs provided 
by the LW reduced ambiguity of directives” (MBL, 2009, p.4). 
The MBL also recorded the frequency with which soldiers used the LW–Manchu 
system’s helmet-mounted display (HMD) during the missions. Most notably, users 
reported the highest frequency of HMD usage during navigation and movement to assault 
position.  Upon contact, the soldiers reported less usage of the HMD. This trend was 
observed during other assessments as well. Figure 16 presents reported HMD-usage 
























Figure 16.   Experimental Force Leader Average HMD Use by Phase of the Operation. 
(From MBL, 2009) 
The second study question addressed during the 2009 LW–Manchu LOE was the 
preferred BOIP. Analysis of the data revealed that both LW-equipped platoons had 
higher force effectiveness ratings than the non–LW-equipped platoons. However, the SL 
BOIP achieved the highest force effectiveness ratings in four of the five missions. Figure 


















Figure 17.   Land Warrior LOE FE Ratings, 2009. (From MBL, 2009) 
The MBL identified some of the reasons for the SL BOIP’s success: 
The EXFOR set the conditions for a successful operation more effectively 
with the SL BOIP because they used the NW to enhance baseline 
capabilities rather than replace them. For example, during movement SLs 
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would provide their lead TL with a distance and direction to the next 
checkpoint. The TL would then navigate using a baseline capability 
(Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR), compass, pace count, etc.). 
(MBL, 2009, p. 4)   
The soldiers conducting the LOE had varied opinions of the BOIP. TLs rated the 
TL BOIP highest, reporting that shared SA with their SLs enabled them to execute their 
directives more effectively and, subsequently, to direct their subordinates more 
effectively.  On the other hand, SLs rated the base case highest because they felt system-
related problems during the LOE distracted them from executing their mission. The 
platoon leader and platoon sergeant ratings were similar to the force effectiveness ratings; 
they rated the SL BOIP highest (MBL, 2009, p. 4).   
The final study question for the LW–Manchu LOE validated the operational KPP 
and KSA threshold values. The performance data from the LOE would be applied to the 
CDD side excursions as they applied to the following:6  
• KPP 2 (Battle Command) 
• KPP 3 (COP: Shared Friendly SA) 
• KSA 4 (Geospatial Data Exchange) 
• KSA 5 (Mobility) 
• KSA 6 (Transmission Range)7 
TRAC–WSMR needed the data from the LW–Manchu LOE in order to complete 
the KPP/KSA validation portion of the AoA and to update their simulation exercise 
(SIMEX) models.  Although the MBL did not perform an analysis on the data collected, 
some of the findings were noteworthy—in particular, the results of the mobility 
evaluation. In this evaluation, the soldiers negotiated an urban individual movement task 
(IMT) course while wearing all of their personal protective equipment integrated with 
LW–Manchu components.  Although the system was below the threshold weight value, it 
was interesting to see the effect the added weight of the LW–Manchu system had on the 
soldiers. Soldiers wearing the LW–Manchu system were, on average, eight seconds 
                                                 
6 The LOE did not intend to address all of the program KPPs. It could not address the network (KPP 1) 
because it required an EPLRS package that is not organic to IBCTs.   
7 The LOE tested transmission range separately, unassisted by the EPLRS radio in the Stryker vehicle 
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slower negotiating the urban IMT course than soldiers without the equipment. Soldiers 
without the LW–Manchu system completed the course in an average of 40.45 seconds, 
while soldiers wearing the system completed the course in an average of 48.55 seconds 
(MBL, 2009). Soldiers wearing the system believed the additional weight decreased their 
ability to perform the IMT course. During the assessment, a survey of 30 soldiers 
reported the system did not give them an advantage while conducting their mission tasks 
on the IMT course. In fact, four soldiers reported they felt no difference with or without 
the system (MBL, 2009).  
During the experiment, the EXFOR survivability was rated highest during base 
case BOIP operations. However, the MBL recorded little difference in the average ratings 
between the BOIPs. For example, when comparing the survivability rating, there was 
only a slight decline between the base case and the TL BOIP missions, 87.32 versus 
81.71, respectively. Although no direct correlations were reported, the TL BOIP 
demonstrated the lowest performance ratings in all three effectiveness categories (MBL, 
2009). 
To summarize the findings of the LW–Manchu LOE of 2009, the MBL reported 
that the SL BOIP demonstrated the highest ratings for force effectiveness. They found 
TLs benefitted from the enhanced SA and clarity in receiving directives; however, the TL 
BOIP showed only marginal improvement in force effectiveness as compared to the base 
case. The soldiers executing the LOE missions were inconsistent in their choice of a 
preferred BOIP. Soldiers cited low imagery resolution and perceived position location 
information (PLI) inaccuracy as factors that reduced their confidence in the system.  
Consequently, the MBL concluded that these factors affected the soldier’s reliance on the 
system.  In the end, the MBL concluded that the SL BOIP led to the highest ratings of 
force effectiveness because leaders could augment the NW capabilities, as required, with 
current equipment.  Ultimately, the MBL’s 2009 LW–Manchu LOE validated that the 
NW-equipped soldiers were markedly better in terms of force effectiveness than currently 
equipped soldiers. However, the findings regarding BOIP remained unclear (MBL, 
2009). 
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I. ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION COMMAND LW–STRIKE 
EMERGING RESULTS BRIEF, FEBRUARY 2, 2010  
From January 6–8, 2010, the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC)8 
conducted an emerging results evaluation of the LW–Strike system in Afghanistan. The 
purpose of this evaluation was to provide the Army G-3 feedback from the 5/2 SBCT on 
their use of the LW–Strike system during OEF. ATEC conducted a brief survey over the 
course of three days, surveying only a small sample of the soldiers from the 5/2 SBCT. 
The survey results highlighted the enhanced capabilities of the LW–Strike system, 
identified some shortcomings, and provided several recommendations (W. Hiatt, personal 
communication, October 22, 2011). A summary of ATEC’s findings concerning the 5/2 
SBCT’s employment of the LW–Strike system in OEF focused on the following five 
areas: 
• Improved Blue SA 
• More Efficient Navigation 
• Soldier Mobility Impacts 
• Lack of Sufficient Training 
• Critical System Limitations    
ATEC found that the LW–Strike system provided leaders at all levels with SA of 
dismounted elements; senior leaders were able to make better informed decisions based 
on blue SA. A battalion commander stated that he used the system as an additional means 
of clearing and verifying fires. In an interview with that same battalion commander, he 
stated, “We had a very tired and worn out commander on the ground calling for fire and 
his grids just didn’t match up. … I denied him his indirect fire until he was able to 
recognize the situation he was in and come back with a better call for fire” (W. Hiatt, 
personal communication, October 22, 2011). In this incident, the LW–Strike provided a 
redundant means of verifying friendly unit locations in order to clear fires while 
mitigating the possibility of fratricide. Close Air Support (CAS) also benefitted from the 
LW–Strike system as aircraft could quickly identify dismounted unit locations and 
                                                 
8 The ATEC Emerging Results Brief was provided to us through electronic communication from 
Major Wayne Hiatt, Assistant TCM–Soldier, 2011. 
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dispositions via the SADL-to-EPLRS link (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 
22, 2011). 
Interestingly, certain models of Air Force aircraft can identify LW icons based on 
their link with the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) network on 
their tactical display via the Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL). Establishing this 
link from air to ground made a huge impact on coordination. Figure 18 is an example of 
how SADL enables Air Force aircraft to identify EPLRS-equipped vehicles and 
dismounted LW–Strike–equipped personnel in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF; 
TCM–S, 2010). 
 
Figure 18.   Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL). (From TCM–S, 2010, p. 6–5) 
In addition to the enhanced SA, ATEC found that the 5/2 SBCT soldiers 
consistently reported that the LW–Strike system increased a unit’s ability to maneuver.  
These findings were consistent with the 5/2 SBCT’s NTC rotation in July 2009.  During 
the 5/2 SBCT’s OEF deployment, 52% (27 of 52) of the soldiers indicated that LW–
Strike was their primary means of navigation.  ATEC’s findings were compared to the 
MBL’s survey, which yielded 70% (90 of 127) of the 5/2 SBCT soldiers indicating that 
LW–Strike helped their ability to navigate.  While the soldiers employed the Strike 
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system for enhanced navigation, the added capability came at the expense of added 
weight and bulk (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011). 
ATEC provides their quantitative analysis of the surveyed sample, stating that six 
of 18 leaders (two at the PLT level, two at the CO level, and two at the BN level) 
surveyed stated that the weight/bulk of the system detracts from its value added.  
Furthermore, ATEC found during two other 5/2 SBCT surveys that 15 of 18 (83%) and 
35 of 52 (67%) of the respondents listed weight/bulk as a weakness of the LW–Strike 
system. The survey also revealed that 31% of the soldiers stated that Stryker 
ingress/egress was an issue due to the size and bulk of the LW–Strike system.  Finally, 
soldiers in the 5/2 SBCT reported carrying seven different types of batteries to include 
those required by the LW–Strike system (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 
2011). The additional batteries required to power all the mission-essential equipment 
contributed to the overall soldier load and hampered soldier mobility. 
As overall soldier mobility was impacted, ATEC found that almost half (41%) of 
the surveyed soldiers stated that the training duration should have been increased. Two-
thirds of the surveyed populations from this question were squad and team leaders.  
Contrary to these results, 11 of 18 leaders (61%), from platoon sergeant through battalion 
commander, felt the training their soldiers received was adequate (W. Hiatt, personal 
communication, October 22, 2011). 
In addition to requesting additional training opportunities, the units ATEC 
surveyed also indicated that the LW–Strike system had some critical limitations. The first 
limitation was that the LW–Strike battery life did not support their mission sets in 
Afghanistan.  The typical mission set described by the sampled population included long 
duration missions, composed largely of dismounted patrols. Each LI-145 battery weighs 
2.1 pounds and typically lasts eight hours (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 
22, 2011). 
The additional weight of LW batteries came at the expense of carrying other 
critical items, such as food, water, and ammunition. Although ATEC did not determine 
the average life of a LW battery, the impact of this limitation centers more on the overall 
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weight of the equipment carried by a soldier, rather than on the inadequate power 
provided by LW batteries. 
Soldiers also reported that the EPLRS network was another critical system 
limitation of the LW system. The LW–Strike system is an EPLRS-based system, mesh 
network that uses line of sight to “talk” to other systems. Due to current network 
limitations and the varied terrain, soldiers reported concerns about the system’s limited 
range and its inability to maintain connectivity. “Once units are out of line-of-site from 
the Stryker, the SA/Comms is degraded and therefore results in a potential loss of the 
most valued capability (Blue SA)” (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 
2011). Although the Stryker vehicles increased the robustness of the EPLRS network, 
dismounted LW–Strike systems produced their own EPLRS network, or clouds, as the 
soldiers maneuvered away from the vehicles. Their internal clouds weakened as 
mountainous terrain and distance separated soldiers from their Strykers and each other 
(W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011). 
The next critical limitation ATEC reported concerns voice communications, 
which may be associated with the lack of a robust EPLRS network.  Based on the limited 
ability of units to communicate with each other, they developed tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) in order to use their AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio 
(MBITR) as their primary means to communicate when they were away from the Stryker 
(W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011).  This was interesting to note as 
all LW–Strike-equipped soldiers continued to employ both radio systems, the CNRs and 
the MBITR. Additionally, the Peltor headsets were regarded as uncomfortable and 
reduced the wearer’s SA. As mentioned earlier, this is another recurring theme in the 
evaluation of the LW–Strike. As a result of their diminishing employment of the Peltor 
headsets, soldiers were less inclined to use the cognitive radio network (CNRS) for voice 
communications. Although the PM continued to seek alternate headsets, the critical 
limitations of the LW–Strike system were reported as the Peltor headsets and CNRS (W. 
Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011). 
The final critical limitation identified in ATEC’s 2010 report centered on the 
reliability of the LW–Strike system. During combat missions, 79% of the soldiers 
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surveyed said they had an LW–Strike system malfunction (W. Hiatt, personal 
communication, October 22, 2011). Although this may appear to be high percentage of 
reported malfunctions, this analysis does not take into consideration the density of errors 
reported. That is to say, when ATEC conducted this survey in January 2010, the 5/2 
SBCT had been deployed to Afghanistan for six months. During those six months, the 
frequency of errors experienced during combat operations would have been a better 
determination of the reliability of the system. ATEC further investigated the severity of 
the malfunctions experienced by the soldiers. Of the 79% who reported a malfunction, 
21% of those soldiers were able to correct the malfunction. These findings are consistent 
with those of the MBL, which found that 20% of the soldiers were able to regain full or 
partial functionality of their system after experiencing a malfunction. Depending on the 
severity of the malfunction, most soldiers simply had to reboot the LW–Strike system in 
order to gain partial or full functionality. ATEC also pointed out that 31 of 43 soldiers 
were unable to correct the malfunctions while on mission. No evidence suggested that a 
mission failed because of a malfunction; the most common impact reported was slowed 
movement (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011).    
Although ATEC’s 2010 LW–Strike brief consisted of only three days of surveys, 
the survey findings reinforced what had already been observed by other organizations. 
While soldiers benefitted from the enhanced SA and precise navigation, units continued 
to report a desire for additional training opportunities prior to deployment. When soldiers 
received inadequate training on equipment, they always reverted back to the systems they 
were familiar with and had a higher level of confidence in. The reported limitations of the 
LW–Strike system’s battery life, network range, communications, and reliability are 
consistent with previous evaluations.   
J. TCM-S’ REQUIRMENTS DILEMMA  
All user representatives face the same challenge of determining the capability 
requirements to fill gaps or exploit opportunities, while at the same time achieving user 
buy-in. Each user within that community has a different perspective of what the objective 
and threshold criteria should be. The dilemma is defining the criteria that best fill the 
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capability gaps while balancing the user community buy-in and what is technologically 
achievable. TCM-S encountered these challenges when developing the functional 
requirements for the LW and the NW.  
When examining the assessment in this chapter, we noted a disparity in the 
outcomes. In particular, we identified conflicting assessments surrounding the 
survivability of the LW. In both ITA’s conducted by TCM-S, the 14th small unit 
capability gap, move under direct fire, was assessed as “not filled” by the LW. TCM-S 
determined the weight of the LW-Manchu and LW-Strike was negated by the system’s 
capability to coordinate tactical fires and movement techniques. Below is the rationale 
TCM-S provided from the 4–9 IN ITA DOTMLPF assessment (2008, P.6–6):   
The [4–9 IN] ITA modified the [2007] TWA [TRAC-WSMR Assessment] 
from “degraded” to “not filled.” The LW [Manchu] system assists in 
coordinating tactical fire and movement techniques. Land Warrior 
supports actions leading up to the final assault. There is no weight 
reduction to the current RFI equipped Soldier. Improvements to the 
system have reduced the weight of the LW system down to 9.94 pounds. 
Any addition to the Soldier’s load may adversely affect Soldiers during 
extended operations and the strenuous actions associated with individual 
movement techniques (TMC-S, 2008).  
The TCM-S 2008 and 2010 in-theater assessments are the exception when 
reporting on the impacts to mobility of the LW system; in comparison to reports from 
external DoD agencies dated 2007, 2009 and 20109, the weight of the LW-Manchu and 
LW-Strike degraded the soldier’s mobility. TCM-S took into consideration the results of 
these three other assessments when developing the mobility requirements for the NW. 
However, the technology did not exist to reduce the weight of the system to reflect the 
user community’s feedback. Therefore, TCM-S defined the NW’s threshold weight 
requirement based on the specifications defined by industry. By doing so, TCM-S 
avoided developing an unachievable weight requirement defined by the user community.  
                                                 
9 The external DoD agency assessments discussed here are the 2007 TRAC-WSMR LW/MW DOTMLPF 
assessment; 2009 Maneuver Battle Lab (MBL) Limited Objective Experiment (LOE); and 2010 ATEC 5/2 
SBCT Emerging Results Brief.  
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K. NETT WARRIOR  
The LW systems served as the prototypes for the NW system. TRADOC initially 
developed the requirements for the NW in 2006, which were very similar to the LW–
Manchu system. The requirements continue to call for a wearable computer that links 
soldiers into a network with voice, data, and GPS, while operating hands-free. TCM–
Soldier expects NW to improve upon the successes of previous LW systems and evolve a 
lighter system that provides battle command and enhanced SA for dismounted and 
mounted forces. According to a General Accountability Office (GAO) report (Extract 11-
233SP; 2011), the NW has three increments. The first increment concentrated on 
developing the SA used with the SBCTs (GAO, 2011). In addition, the Army has 
identified five critical technologies nearing maturity for NW Increment I: 
• Energy/power management subsystem 
• Antenna 
• Navigation 
• User control 
• Voice intelligibility 
The Army is aware that the NW Increment I will not achieve its fully networked 
capability until the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is incorporated after full-rate 
production (GAO, 2011). In the following chapter, the authors will only discuss the first 
two increments of the NW system because Increment III is a future development beyond 
the scope of this report. 
K. CONCLUSIONS 
When units began taking the LW systems to combat, it allowed the PM to 
continue to improve the system through feedback from experience in combat. The 4–9 IN 
decision to take the LW-Manchu system to combat served as the mechanism for change. 
This facilitated system improvements that would later become the LW-Strike. Three 
Stryker Brigades Combat Teams would take the LW-Strike system to Afghanistan. 
Although unplanned, the PM was able to test the system in two vastly different 
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operational environments in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the LW system served only 
as a partial solution to the user requirements as developed by TCM-S.  
Technology was still not mature enough to fully develop the system that would 
meet the user expectations. For example, through operational deployments, system 
reliability was an issue as users reported frequent system reboots. Without a robust 
network, range of communications led to fragmented networks. User feedback continued 
to reinforce the need for lighter components to address mobility and survivability 
concerns.  
User buy-in is key to the success of any DoD program. By coincidence, the 4–9 
IN had a year to train on individual and collective tasks integrating the LW system prior 
to deployment. This was never duplicated by follow-on units prior to taking the system to 
combat. As a result, the system never reached the level of user acceptance achieved by 
the 4–9 IN. This was not the fault of the TCM-S, who was not in the position to influence 
unit training schedules or the availability of LW systems needed to effectively train units 
prior to deployment.  
TCM-S must carefully analyze a litany of metrics concerning supportability, 
maintainability, reliability, feasibility, cost, schedule, and performance. This careful and 
thorough analysis must be conducted when determining the correct materiel solution to 
equip the warfighter. User requirements are also developed through User interaction and 
feedback. If TCM-S does not receive user buy-in, it affects their credibility and their 
programs suffer. This requires TCM-S to maintain a balance between industry and the 
user community to achieve requirements that are both technologically feasible and meet 
user expectations. All this is done while maintaining a partnership with the Program 
Manager who is responsible for executing the program requirements. We discuss more on 
this point in the next chapter. In Figure 19 we break out the LW/NW key events 
beginning in 2005 through 2011.  
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Figure 19.   Key events in the LW/NW timeline.  
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IV. THE NETT WARRIOR MATERIEL DEVELOPER’S 
PERSPECTIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the Nett Warrior (NW) acquisition strategy 
and the developmental challenges from the materiel developer’s perspective. We will 
initially discuss the incremental approach of the Future Force Warrior (FFW) that led to 
the development of the NW system. Next we will discuss how the program manager 
(PM) abbreviated the typical acquisition model in the development of the NW system. 
Then, we will present the results of the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command 
(ATEC) evaluation of the NW Limited User Test (LUT). Finally, we will examine how 
the Army’s Configuration Steering Board (CSB) affected the NW program. Ultimately, 
this chapter outlines some of the challenges of the development, testing, and production 
of the NW program.   
As General Peter Chiarelli (2011), Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, outlined in his 
March 9, 2011, address to the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, 
NW was one of the Army’s FY2012 priority programs, which was mentioned under the 
Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS10). NW was on a parallel developmental path of being 
interoperable with the JTRS Rifleman Radio (RR), AN/PRC-154. “The Rifleman Radio 
is the dismounted Soldier capability that utilizes the SRW [Soldier Radio] waveform to 
connect the Soldier to the Leader. The system provides voice and individual location 
information [and] primarily serves the maneuver team formation, and provides a 
complimentary capability to the NW-enabled Leader” (Chiarelli, 2011, pp. 9–10). While 
on parallel developmental paths, the ultimate goal was to provide the ground fighting 
soldier with enhanced SA and communications capabilities leading toward a net-centric 
effect of combining interoperability of voice and data systems.   
                                                 
10 The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a Defense Department–wide initiative to develop a 
family of revolutionary software-programmable tactical radios interoperable across the joint battle space 
providing the warfighter with voice, data, and video communications. 
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B. INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO THE FUTURE FORCE WARRIOR 
(FFW)  
In 1989, Natick Soldier Center introduced the soldier system concept, commonly 
referred to as Soldier-as-a-system (SaaS). This approach considered viewing the soldier 
as a functioning system similar to that of any other major weapon system such as a tank 
or helicopter. Viewing soldiers as a system led to the development of the current NW 
system and the Future Force Warrior (FFW) program. According to Philip Brandler 
(2005), U.S. Natick Soldier Center, there were four increments planned for the FFW 
which encompassed the Dismounted Battle Command System (DBCS), LW, and NW 
Increment I and II (Brandler, 2005). Figure 20 depicts the four increments of the FFW. 
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Figure 20.   Incremental Approach of the Future Force Warrior. (After TCM–S, 2008; 
Smith, 2009) 
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The first increment of the FFW consisted of the DBCS, which included a hand-
held Commander’s Digital Assistant (CDA) and EPLRS or MicroLight radio to assist 
soldiers in navigation, mission planning, and blue force tracking capabilities (Brandler, 
2005).  
  The second increment was the LW system. This increment focused on enhancing 
the Situational Awareness (SA) of dismounted soldiers within the SBCTs. The LW 
system expanded the soldier’s SA via connectivity with the lower tactical internet, 
vehicle to dismounted soldier communications and soldier to soldier communication 
while mounted and dismounted (Brandler, 2005). Lessons learned from combat 
deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan were applied to the development of the next 
increment of the FFW, the Nett Warrior system.    
The third increment of the FFW is the NW system which began in 2009. This 
increment is also known as NW Increment I (NW Inc I). NW Inc I will be a fully-
integrated, modular system that meets the threshold requirements of the NW Capability 
Development Document (CDD) with improved capabilities in lethality and survivability 
while being interoperable with various vehicle platforms. NW Inc I will integrate 
multiple soldier systems and components while leveraging emerging technologies 
(Brandler, 2005).    
NW focuses on the development of SA systems, enhanced navigation, and 
reduction of fratricide facilitated by a shared common operating picture (COP) on a 
digitized battlefield. This program includes pre-planned product improvement (P3I) to 
integrate the JTRS Small Form Factor B (SFF–B) once the system is validated and 
proven (Smith, 2009).   
The fourth increment, NW Increment II, is the objective system which builds 
upon the previous increment’s CDD threshold system. This system is intended to fully 
integrate the dismounted soldier under a unified battle command system and additional 
emerging technologies with the network (Brandler, 2005).  
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C. NETT WARRIOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION STRATGEY 
Unconventional with respect to most acquisition programs, the NW’s strategy 
planned to abbreviate the systematic progression of achieving Milestones A, B, and C. 
The NW program bypassed Milestone B, planning to progress from Milestone A to 
Milestone C in approximately 21 months, 7.5 months prototyping phase and 13.5 month 
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Figure 21.   Nett Warrior’s Abbreviated Acquisition Roadmap. (From Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (From: [USD(AT&L)], 
2008) 
The NW acquisition strategy incorporated mature technology from the LW’s 
radio, communication software, and battery. In June 2009, the program manager for NW 
commented about the developmental strategy, “We are driving the industry partners to 
focus in on reductions in weight, size and the overall power management of the system. I 
don’t want them to go out there and recreate a new radio or headsets, they are already out 
there and the government can provide that. What I want them to do is to take the basic 
guts of the system and put more capability in a smaller box” (Cummings, 2009). The 
overall acquisition strategy was intended to manage the technological risk of the program 
while reducing the overall schedule. In the program’s February 19, 2009, Milestone A 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), in addition to providing exit criteria, it also 
allowed for a Milestone B or C decision review based on the technology readiness levels.  
The Deputy PM for LW stated the NW program planned to demonstrate the 
technology readiness in order to bypass Milestone B: 
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The DAB [Defense Acquisition Board] will review the program at the 
conclusion of the Limited User Test (LUT) to assess readiness for entry 
into either the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase 
or the Production & Deployment (P&D) phase. The decision to pursue 
EMD or P&D (i.e., approve Milestone B or C) will be informed by the 
results of the LUT and a Technology Readiness Assessment of the GSE 
program by the Director, Defense Research & Engineering. The decision 
to approve Milestone B or C will also be contingent on meeting the 
requirements of section 2366b of title 10, USC. (Geddes, 201011) 
The Technology Development Strategy (TDS) from December 2008 projected the 
NW Milestone C decision for the end of 2QFY2011 (D. Edwards, personal 
communication, November 23, 2011). Having gained approval in February 2009 from the 
MDA, John J. Young, Jr., former USD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(AT&L), the program was able to bypass Milestone B based on the technology readiness 
levels of the system (D. Edwards, personal communication, November 23, 2011). After 
completing the LUT, the NW program intended to conduct a down-select, eliminating at 
least one of the three vendors prior to achieving a Milestone C decision. After Milestone 
C, the program would enter into the production phase in order to begin equipping 30 
BCTs with the NW system. Figure 22 depicts the initial acquisition roadmap. 
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Figure 22.   Initial NW Acquisition Roadmap. (From: Wood, 2009) 
D. NETT WARRIOR: MATERIEL SOLUTION ANALYSIS PHASE 
In 2008, the NW program began with the materiel solution analysis (MSA) phase, 
which assessed potential materiel solutions to fill a military need. In this case, the Army 
continued to pursue a battle command system for the ground fighting soldier. The MSA 
phase began only after the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) approved 
                                                 
11 The NW APM provided this February 2009 ADM excerpt on November 30, 2010. 
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the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). The ICD defined the requirement for a materiel 
or non-materiel solution and summarized the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) assessment.   
During the pre-Milestone A activities for the NW program, observations from 4–9 
IN’s employment of the LW system refined the user’s needs and capability gaps. In a 
master's thesis by Nile Clifton, Jr. and Douglas Copeland (2008) completed at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, the authors interviewed PM LW about the use of Unit System 
Integrators (USI) with 4–9 IN. The authors reported that prior to 4–9 IN deployment, the 
PM implemented the USI concept to address declining user acceptance to the LW system. 
The primary purpose of the USI was to utilize a certified LW instructor knowledgeable 
on all technical issues of the system that could assist with training plans and operational 
procedures. These USIs were embedded with the unit and developed a habitual 
relationship. During the 4–9 IN deployment, April 2007 to June 2008, USIs, field service 
representatives (FSR), and TCM–S were embedded with the unit at the company and 
battalion level. In addition to assisting the unit with system application, sustainment, 
training, and maintenance, these personnel also gathered relevant operational feedback 
from the unit (Clifton & Copeland, 2008).  
The operational feedback from 4–9 IN, combined with the 19 small unit 
capability gaps12 defined by the LW/MW DOTMLPF assessment conducted from May 
2006 to February 2007. The 19 small unit capability gaps identified by the 2007 LW/MW 
DOTMLPF assessment, depicted in Figure 23, were incorporated into the materiel 
solution analysis leading to the NW Milestone A decision in 2QFY2009 (TCM–S, 2008). 
From the gathered operational feedback, the NW’s Materiel Solution Analysis was 
informed of the current user needs, operational constraints, and functional requirements 
that contributed to the NW’s acquisition roadmap.  
                                                 
12 The 2007 LW/MW DOTMLPF Assessment was intended to inform the 2007 LW Milestone C 
decision of March 2007 (TCM-S, 2008). 
 63 
 
Figure 23.   The 19 Small Unit Capability Gaps Defined by the 2007 LW/MW DOTMLPF 
Assessment. (From TCM–S, 2008) 
E. NETT WARRIOR: TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PHASE  
On February 15, 2009, the NW program entered into the technology development 
phase and awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts to General Dynamics, Raytheon, and 
Rockwell Collins for prototypes (GAO, 2011, p. 146). Following the contract award, the 
PM met with all three awardees to conduct a kick-off meeting on April 20, 2009. During 
this meeting, the PM addressed all three awardees focusing on his vision of success, 
laying out program goals and discussing the specifics of the statement of work (SOW). 
Other topics addressed were detailing a common understanding on communication 
procedures, schedule, deliverables, and risks to the program (Wood, 2009). Additionally 
at the meeting, the PM NW directly addressed hoped-for benefits of competitive 
prototyping, as described in the following quote:  
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LTC Roland Gaddy, Program Manager for NW, said all three competitors 
have a history with soldier systems. General Dynamics was the prime 
contractor on Land Warrior, but Rockwell Collins built a lot of the 
hardware and Raytheon provided the radio for the system. Using three 
competing companies during the development phase of the program likely 
will mean that the Army will get more bang for its buck come production 
time. It drives down price and drives up innovation. (Beidel, 2010)  
Each of the vendors produced 60 competitive prototype systems that underwent 
developmental testing led by ATEC at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and Electronic 
Proving Ground, AZ, from May through August 2010. The developmental testing 
revealed that each of the three vendors experienced shortcomings in their systems which 
were scheduled for the Limited User Testing (LUT) in October through November 2010. 
“During developmental tests in May–June 2010, none of the contractor-provided Nett 
Warrior systems met the threshold for Mean Time Between Essential Function Failure 
(MTBEFF)” (GAO, 2011). All three of the vendors were to make improvements to their 
systems in order to achieve the threshold for MTBEFF prior to entering into the LUT. 
The PM planned to combine the operational testing with the LUT, taking advantage of 
combining the test events to reduce cost and schedule impacts.   
In October 2010, the NW program projected completion of Milestone C in 
2QFY2011. However, without an approved presidential budget for FY2011, continuing 
resolutions constrained funding that could be made available for the NW program. The 
continuing resolutions limited the amount of funding available because funds were not 
appropriated. After the FY2011 budget was approved, the Milestone (MS) C preparation 
restarted in May 2011 and was rescheduled for mid-July. The resulting two month 
schedule shift is reflected in Figure 24 as of May 2011. The chart also shows how the 
feedback gathered from operational deployments influenced the program’s development. 
We created this figure using images from the ATEC’s NW LUT results (W. Hiatt, 
personal communication, October 22, 2011). 
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Figure 24.   Nett Warrior Acquisition Roadmap as of May 2011. (From: Hiatt, 2011)13 
The NW system was originally intended to be an improved system spawned from 
its predecessor, the Land Warrior system. The vendors received Government-furnished 
property giving them a partial materiel solution. Therefore, the vendors began their 
development and integration efforts with a partial materiel solution. The vendors would 
develop the remaining components which included the hands-free display, the headset, 
the computer, the user input device, the navigation system, the antenna, and the 
associated cables (Smith, 2009). Although limiting some of the developmental risk by 
using what was thought to be mature technology, this strategy also reintroduced 
shortcomings of the LW system associated with the weight, power, radio, and reliability.  
Below is a list of the significant milestones achieved and future plans for the NW 
program as 1QFY2011 from the PEO–Soldier (2011, p. 188). 
PROGRAM STATUS 
2QFY2009   Milestone A 
3QFY2009   Competitive contracts awarded (three) 
                                                 
13 Figure 23 depicts the operationally deployed units equipped with LW: 4-9 Infantry (IN) Battalion, 
5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment, and 1/25 Stryker Brigade 
Combat Team.  
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4QFY2011 [09]14  Prototyping phase 
1QFY2010   Field evaluations (three) 
1QFY2010   Critical design reviews (three) 
3Q–4QFY2010  Developmental testing 
4QFY2010   Limited User Tests (three) 
PROJECTED ACTIVITIES15 
2QFY2012   Contract Award/Down-Select to one or two vendors 
3QFY2013– 1QFY2014 Low Rate Initial Production 
2QFY2014– 4QF20Y16 Full Rate Production 
F. NW LUT (OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 2010) 
After completing developmental testing in August 2010, the NW LUT was 
conducted at Fort Riley, KS, from October to November 2010. This event was the first 
operational test event for the NW systems (GAO, 2011). Three companies from a 
battalion were equipped with one of the three vendors’ sets of prototypes. The U.S. Army 
Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) supervised the LUT, calling for each company to 
cycle through separate but parallel tests on simulated urban, dense woodland, and open 
terrain. Each vendor system conducted 96-hour scenarios in the three different terrains 
(Lundgren, 2010). The companies tested the NW system separately from each other to 
maintain the competition-sensitive nature of the LUT. None of the testing units saw the 
other version of the NW they were testing (Gould, 2010). Upon completion of the 2010 
NW LUT, PM NW planned to conduct a down-select, eliminating at least one of the three 
competing vendors (Geddes, 2011, September, 3).  
                                                 
14 This is a correction to the calendar on PEO–Soldier’s website.  Based on the acquisition lifecycle 
framework, this should be FY2009.  
15 At the time that PEO–Soldier released the projected NW activities, the actions of the Configuration 
Steering Board were not known.  
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G. ATEC’S NW LUT ASSESSMENT (MAY 2011)16 
In May 2011, ATEC briefed their assessment of the NW LUT in preparation for 
the MS C decision. Their analysis found that NW improved current capabilities for SA, 
navigation, planning, and some aspects of C2. “The capability [NW] shows promise and 
is highly desired by TCM–Soldier; however, all vendors require additional materiel 
solution modifications to realize a capability at all echelons” (W. Hiatt, personal 
communication, October 22, 2011). ATEC recommended that the NW system not be 
deployed until improved technical performance has been demonstrated principally 
regarding clarity of voice communications, system reliability, electromagnetic 
interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC), and weight/bulk. Lower level 
recommendations are covered later in this section (W. Hiatt, personal communication, 
October 22, 2011). 
1. ATEC’s NW LUT EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT 
ATEC’s NW effectiveness assessment concluded that poor mobility and voice 
communications negated the positive effects on mission accomplishment, resulting in an 
overall negligible outcome. Soldiers felt that their individual mobility was negatively 
impacted by the additional 14 pounds of weight from the NW system with three batteries 
(KSA 5)17. In addition, 82%–90% of the soldiers rated voice communications as 
ineffective due to a lack of clarity (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011). 
ATEC also found that NW’s utility was significantly tied to the echelon, specific mission, 
and phase of operation (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011). Figure 25 
depicts how the utility of the NW system varied by echelon. 
                                                 
16 The NW Milestone Decision Brief was provided by Major Wayne Hiatt, Assistant TCM–Soldier, 
who received it from Major Doug Copeland, Assistant PM NW. 
17 ATEC instrumentation added an additional 11.1 pounds to the soldier. 
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Figure 25.   ATEC’s 2011 NW LUT Assessment: Utility Assessment by Echelon. (From: 
Hiatt, 2011) 
2. ATEC’s NW LUT SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The overall operational suitability of the NW was evaluated as “not suitable,” 
according to ATEC’s NW LUT assessment. Soldiers reported that the NW degraded 
operations in terms of its reliability, maintainability, weight, and human factors 
engineering (HFE). Reliability was low due to the frequent system reboots18 which 
significantly reduced system utility. Maintainability was degraded due to the immature 
built-in test (BIT) that could not correctly diagnose faulty line-replaceable units (LRU)19, 
with 80% accuracy. Furthermore, the NW systems did not meet the 95% requirement that 
all malfunctions were to be correctable at the field level within 20 minutes for dedicated 
maintenance support and for operators (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 
2011). 
                                                 
18 The LW–Manchu demonstrated system failures that also resulted in reboots. 
19 A line-replaceable unit is a modular component of a system that is designed to be replaced quickly 
at an operating location. 
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3. ATEC’s NW LUT SURVIVABILITY 
ATEC found that the majority of survivability requirements were either not met or 
not assessed and, overall, degraded operations. The three major categories that affected 
the survivability of the NW system were electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic 
compatibility (EMI/EMC), susceptibility to light emissions, and chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) standards (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 
22, 2011). 
4. ANALYSIS OF ATEC’s NW LUT ASSESSMENT 
To summarize the ATEC’s overall assessment of the NW LUT, all three versions 
of the competitive prototypes demonstrated significant deficiencies. ATEC recommended 
that the NW system not be deployed until improved technical performance was achieved. 
The system deficiencies identified by ATEC’s evaluation may have contributed to the 
involvement of the Army’s Configuration Steering Board (CSB) to curtail the possible 
growth in development and procurement costs of the NW’s approved baseline cost 
estimate.  
H. NETT WARRIOR AND THE CONFIGURATION STEERING BOARD 
At the July 11, 2011, pre-Milestone C Army System Acquisition Review Council 
(ASARC), the PM NW suggested incorporating a smart phone device. The Vice Chief of 
Staff of the Army (VCSA) supported his suggestion, leading to the discussion on how 
this could be accomplished. “The ASARC agreed that the smart phone device was the 
best COA [course of action] and, as a consequence of approving the recommended path 
ahead, the PM had to go to the Configuration Steering Board (CSB) for de-scoping” 
(Geddes, 2011). In following month in August 2011, the CSB de-scoped the NW 
requirements, allowing the smart phone device to be incorporated into the NW system 
(W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011)20. The Army called this smart 
phone device, the “end-user device” (EUD). In addition to the NW LUT assessment, 
                                                 
20 Major Wayne Hiatt, Assistant TCM-Soldier, provided the trigger CSB NW brief. 
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PEO–Soldier identified several other factors that significantly influenced the CBS’s 
adjustment of the NW requirements: 
• Emergence of low cost, commercial technologies 
• Demonstrations of viable COTS, in particular, smart phones 
• Current constrained budgeting influences 
The PM NW conducted a trade-off analysis of how a smart phone device would 
impact the small unit capability gaps and size, weight, power, and cost (SWAP–C). The 
rationale for the NW’s key performance parameters (KPP) and key system attributes 
(KSA) were adjusted to address SWAP–C concerns and incorporate emerging 
commercial technology. In effect, no KPPs were changed and only one KSA was 
changed from 24 hours of power to eight. In addition, KSA 5, mobility, was reduced 
from a maximum of 14 pounds down to three pounds. Including the 2.2 pounds from the 
Rifleman Radio (RR), the total weight of the NW EUD system would be approximately 
5.7 pounds with eight hours of operation (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 
2011). 
The CSB was also informed of the associated limitations of using a commercial-
based smart phone device connected to the Rifleman’s Radio (RR). These limitations 
included incorporating commercial standards for ruggedization of the smart phones and 
relying on RR to secure the data transferred between RR systems. The ruggedization of 
the smart phone will be a consideration for the PM in terms of logistical support to 
provide spares due to meeting commercial standards for shock, drop, and environmental 
resistance. An adequate number of spares will need to be available to maintain 
operational availability (W. Hiatt, personal communication, October 22, 2011).  
I. NETT WARRIOR END USER DEVICE (EUD)  
Given the long history of weight, size, and capability issues from the LW system, 
NW will integrate lighter, relatively inexpensive smart phones to alleviative issues that 
plagued the previous versions. PEO–Soldier recognized the significant cost and weight 
savings through researching and testing COTS smart phones. PEO–Soldier estimates that 
moving forward in this direction will drop 70% of the original weight from the system 
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(Lowe, 2011). The Deputy Product Manager for NW also confirmed that connecting an 
EUD to the Rifleman Radio with secure voice and data capabilities will reduce the 
original program procurement cost of the NW by 50% (Lowe, 2011). Due to the 
reduction in total program cost, the NW program changed acquisition category from 
ACAT I to ACAT II. With the change in acquisition category, in addition to the program 
dollar threshold reduction, the oversight fell from DoD-wide to Army level.  With the 
addition of the EUD, NW will focus its efforts on providing position location, enhanced 
navigation, and enhanced SA through a digital, secure COP. As demonstrated by the ITA 
and user feedback, these three capabilities have been the most utilized NW functions. 
Figure 26 shows PEO–Soldier’s latest NW EUD with a chest mount and the JTRS radio.   
 
Figure 26.   NW End User Device (EUD) With JTRS Radio. (From PEO–Soldier, 2011) 
While incorporating the commercial technology, PM NW is aware of the 
associated security challenges in the near future. With the commercially available devices 
of the "open" Android system, the smart phone will be connected to the secure network 
through the AN/PRC-154 Rifleman Radio. Therefore, PM NW is confident in 
minimizing the hacking risk (Lowe, 2011). In the spring of 2012, PEO-Soldier is 
expected to announce which smart phone will be incorporated into the NW system and 
plans to annually review advances in commercial technology (Lowe, 2011). 
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In accordance with the PM’s suggestion to incorporate an EUD, the PM has 
mitigated the issues of power and weight that plagued previous NW and LW systems. 
However, this course of action directly ties the success of the NW program to the RR, or 
similar radio, that is to be integrated. The NW system no longer is responsible for 
providing the devices that generate the network, provide GSP tracking, hearing 
protection, and a microphone. These requirements are inherent to the communication 
device with which the NW system will integrate. Alleviated from these requirements, the 
NW program can shift its focus on the situational awareness and battle command 
performance aspects that have provided soldiers with the most utility according to 
operational feedback and assessments.  
The NW program expects a two quarter delay to incorporate the EUD. The PM 
NW plans to meet the Army’s acquisition objective of fielding 30 BCTs by the end of 
FY2017. Considering the significant change in the program’s direction, a six-month 
delay is of marginal impact.  
J. NW EUD SUSTAINMENT PLAN 
Unlike the sustainment plan from the LW deployments, the NW EUD should 
enable the Army to completely manage the logistics support required upon fielding. 
During the LW deployments, the Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) plan consisted of 
two sub-units established at each FOB, the Unit System Integrators (USIs) and the Field 
Service Representatives (FSRs). While not only serving to provide sustainment training, 
the USIs and FSRs provided field level maintenance support and managed the depot-level 
maintenance. The CLS package managed all spare components for the LW system 
(TCM–S, 2010). Due to the relatively low cost of a smart phone and lack of components, 
the NW EUD should not require as robust of a CLS package as the LW system. By 
design, the EUD is a low unit cost device with only one major component. Technical 
support could be made available through a help desk and user tutorials to assist operators 
to use the full capability of the EUD. The technical support would also assist in restoring 
operation during malfunctions. 
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K. LESSONS LEARNED 
There are several lessons learned during the development of the Nett Warrior. 
There were several important program management considerations noted concerning 
integration of COTS, risk management, and maintaining flexibility. The PM was able to 
apply lessons learned from the 4–9 IN deployment during the pre-acquisition phase of the 
NW acquisition. However, during the acquisition phase, the PM experienced a sliding 
scale of user acceptance, beginning with the deployment to Afghanistan. The NW 
program was directed to reassess its acquisition strategy due to diminishing user 
acceptance, increased user expectations, and the emergence of the smart phone. 
As demonstrated with the NW, incorporating commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
components may justify abbreviating the acquisition model, but this action does not 
necessarily reduce risk to the program. From 4–9 IN’s operational feedback, the system 
filled or mitigated 13 of the 19 small unit capability gaps. The majority of the Manchu 
feedback openly praised the LW system. Therefore, the NW acquisition strategy in 2009 
incorporated several key components from the LW system. The U.S. Army Contracting 
Command awarded contracts to three vendors to develop the NW system for testing and 
evaluation.  The PM NW executed testing of the three prototypes at Fort Riley, KS, in 
order to inform the Milestone Decision Authority to achieve MS C set for mid-July 
FY2011. However, as the operational environment changed and the emergence of the 
smart phone proliferated in the commercial market, soldier acceptance began to waiver, 
as evidenced by ATEC’s Emerging Results brief of 5/2 SBCT in February 2010 and 
2SCR’s post deployment surveys of July 2011.  
Common to most acquisition programs, defining the materiel requirements can 
present a challenge and become part of the problem. Leveraging the feedback from 4–9 
IN, the NW was on the glide path to fulfilling the KPPs and KSAs. Even though the NW 
system came in at 7 pounds, half of the threshold weight requirement, soldiers still 
reported that the weight of the system affected their mobility. However, soldiers 
questioned why they were being fielded a 7-pound system when a smart phone weighed 
only a fraction of that, approximately 3 pounds.  
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There are two considerations commonly overlooked when discussing smart phone 
technology for the warfighter. They are, first, how can the Army establish a network to 
support the smart phone, and second, how might the system secure the information 
transmitted while using commercial technology? Soldiers saw the smart phone provide 
similar capabilities to that of the NW system, at a fraction of the weight. Soldier feedback 
became one of the driving forces for the PM to re-examine the NW program strategy.  
L. CONCLUSION 
From the materiel developers’ perspective, several lessons can be learned from 
the NW program. In particular, generalizations can be made that may apply to other 
programs within the DoD acquisition community. PMs have long understood that user 
acceptance is the key for any program to succeed. This tenet has been evident through the 
LW and was the rationale behind embedding USIs into a unit as early as possible.  
From a strategic point of view, active participation and sponsorship in technology 
demonstrations and initiatives related to an emerging system can have a favorable effect 
on the future of a program. Push and pull feedback mechanisms must be established 
amongst PMs, TCMs, and key users. PMs and TCMs must be willing and able to rapidly 
respond to customer feedback. 
NW has written a new chapter in the history of the warfighter’s battle command 
system. The combined effects of the July 2011 ASARC and the August 2011 
Configuration Steering Board (CSB) are yet to be fully understood. Whatever the case 
may be, the PM must continue to be engaged in maturing technology to deliver required 
capabilities to the users in a timely and cost-effective manner. Through the CSB’s 
actions, the NW program was able to incorporate an innovative solution, alleviating 
issues of weight and power.  
While exploration of emerging commercial technologies combined with the 
authorization of the ASARC has resulted in a new direction for the NW program, several 
ongoing challenges remain. First, the PM must continue to take a holistic approach to 
integrating the SaaS concept to the NW, while placing the least amount of burden on the 
warfighter. Additionally, the PM must attempt to minimize the impact placed on the 
 75 
soldier through weight and mass that have plagued the previous version of the NW and 
its predecessor, the LW. A new challenge is posed by the development of the NW End 
User Device (EUD) that must succeed through rigorous developmental and operational 
testing prior to fielding. The optimal solution is one that balances proven capabilities at 
an acceptable weight—in a configuration that achieves user buy-in.  
Nett Warrior has come a long way in resolving some of the difficulties mentioned 
in this section. The way ahead must be grounded in thorough testing in order to rectify 
many of the deficiencies ATEC has identified. The PM must place increased emphasis on 
improving operational effectiveness, suitability, and sustainability. In addition, 
improvements regarding reliability, supportability, and affordability should be 
considered. In sum, the outlook is good, but the future NW system must be thoroughly 
tested before equipping soldiers. 
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V. BUDGET DECISIONS AFFECTING THE LW/NW PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Do more without more! (USD[AT&L]) Ashton Carter (USD[AT&L, 
2010). 
The country is fighting an economic crisis and the Secretary of Defense is looking 
for ways to cut spending in order to maintain military capacity. Under the current fiscal 
situation, programs big and small come under close scrutiny. As former Secretary of 
Defense Gates reminded us in his speech at the Eisenhower Library on May 8, 2010, 
“Eisenhower strongly believed that the United States—indeed, any nation—could only be 
as militarily strong as it was economically dynamic and fiscally sound. We recognize the 
imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave 
implications” (Gates, 2010). This is also echoed in the above quote from former 
USD(AT&L) Carter.  
To reinforce the imminent changes in the acquisition community, Carter provided 
guidance in September 2010 to all acquisition professionals. In his memorandum he 
stated his guidance for obtaining greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending. 
What this means for the Army is an inward look at itself and how dollars can be saved.  
The NW Program will be a target for affordability and control of cost growth.  
This chapter outlines the budget allocated for the LW/NW soldier system. 
Through an analysis of the FY budgets and Congressional report language, we discuss the 
impacts of the program’s budget appropriations during FY2006 to FY2011. Although the 
scope of our research covers FY2006 to FY2011, it is our intent to give the reader 
background on the decisions that affected FY2006. In order to do so, our analysis begins 
with a review of program decisions that occurred in FY2005.  As we will discuss, the 
funding for this program is atypical. 
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B. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES AND CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
DECISIONS 
Acquisition strategy is a framework for planning, directing, contracting for, and 
managing a program. All actions required for a successful program are scheduled within 
this framework.  An acquisition strategy must gain approval prior to execution of MS B 
and requires updates whenever the program goes through a major decision review (DAU, 
2011a).  
As a negative example, the failed development of the Battle Command System in 
FY2005 shows how schedule shifts and program delays can jeopardize or postpone a 
program’s development. When the PM was directed by the Army to develop the Battle 
Command System, the subsequent split in funds and development caused a change to his 
program strategy that resulted in an 18-month slippage of the LW development (Clifton 
& Copeland, 2008). 
C. LW/NW CONGRESSIONAL AND ARMY BUDGET DECISIONS 
1. FY2005 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY2005 
In 2005 the Army made the decision to focus the LW development into a Stryker 
battalion for the purposes of a DOTMLPF assessment in FY2006. During this year, two 
of four critical LW technologies were mature. Amongst the mature items was the helmet-
mounted display and power (battery). The two lagging technologies were the personal 
area network (the cables, connectors, and interface that link the system to each of its 
components) and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) radio communications package.  
The JTRS radio was viewed as the biggest program risk because it was not expected to be 
mature until FY2011.  In light of the radio delay, the Enhanced Position Location 
Reporting System (EPLRS) radio, single channel, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
system was chosen as a short-term solution until the JTRS system became available 
(GAO, 2005). 
During this year, the PM re-focused the LW program strategy to include the 
Battle Command System. General Dynamics Defense Systems (GDDS) was awarded a 
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cost-performance-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract to develop the Battle Command System 
capabilities and continued to develop the LW in parallel efforts. The Battle Command 
System is a hand-held device, similar to today’s tablets and met most of the LW 
requirements. It used a different communications package called the Enhanced Position 
Location Reporting System (EPLRS) MicroLight Radio waveform.  During operational 
testing (OT) by the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY, the Battle Command 
System was found to be unreliable and not ready for fielding. The test results that 
demonstrated the system was not mature included excessive weight, unreliable 
communications, and poor user interface.  Negative user feedback from the Battle 
Command System OT led the PM LW to restructure the LW program (DOT&E, 2005).  
Based on the Army Ranger’s 2005 assessment at Fort Polk, LA, that the LW was 
a suitable materiel solution, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) directed the 
Army to conduct an LW DOTMLPF assessment to be held in 3QFY2006 by one Stryker 
battalion. The decision to field a Stryker battalion was based on their TO&E 
communications platform, the Stryker vehicle.  Each vehicle came equipped with an 
EPLRS radio, and its interoperability with the LW and the lower tactical internet (LTI) 
provided the system interface the PM was looking for (Clifton & Copeland, 2008). After 
the poor Battle Command System assessment, the PM changed his acquisition strategy to 
integrate existing mature technologies from the Battle Command System program into 
the LW program. This differed from the PM’s previous strategy because he no longer had 
to wait on the maturation of JTRS technology. This technology integration would further 
support the Stryker battalion fielding, DOTMLPF TTP assessment, and LUT planned for 
FY2006 (DA, 2005a).  On June 28, GDC4S was awarded a sole source firm-fixed 
contract of $30 million to develop 372 LW systems and Stryker vehicle integration kits 
for evaluation into a Stryker battalion to facilitate the DOTMLPF TTP assessment 
(General Dynamics [GD], 2011).  
During FY2005, the appropriations were divided between the Battle Command 
System and LW programs.  According to the budget justification for February 2005 (R2a 
Exhibit), $72.9 million was spent on the LW program in support of developmental and 
operational tests and system engineering support for the overall program (DA, 2005a).  
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2. FY2006 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY2006 
In 3QFY2006, the first spiral of the PM LW new procurement strategy equipped 
4–9 IN with 372 LW prototypes to be tested during the DOTMLPF TTP assessment. 
Further, the outcome of the assessment would be used to define future spiral requirements 
for the program (DA, 2006). 
In 4QFY2006, the 4–9 IN DOTMLFP TTP assessment successfully demonstrated 
the LW as an effective materiel solution.  This provided Army leadership with the 
confidence the LW system would achieve an MS C (low rate initial production, LRIP) 
decision by the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) in FY2007 (DOT&E, 2006). 
According to the 2006 Army RDT&E Budget, $49.5 million in funds were 
appropriated for the year; $24.9 million was requested for development engineering and 
$13.6 million to support program management and systems engineering (DA, 2006). 
Additional funds obligated for the program were OPA dollars in support of initial spares 
for $35.2 million. All told, the FY2006 budget for the LW program was $84.7 million.  
3. FY2007  
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY2007 
In FY2007 the Government exercised an option to the FY2005 sole source firm-
fixed contract for $13.6 million to GDC4S for an additional 173 LW prototypes to 
support and train participants in preparation for the 4–9 IN DOTMLPF TTP assessment 
in support of an MS C decision (DA, 2006). This fielding supported the PM’s program 
strategy to conduct the DOTMLPF TTP assessment with a Stryker battalion in support of 
an MS C decision. The 4–9 IN was given until the end of FY2007 (one year) to conduct 
training with the equipment before the evaluation. The basis of the issue fielding strategy 
was to issue the LW down to the team leader (DA, 2007b).  During the DOTMLPF TTP 
assessment in 2006, the PM LW saw the advantage of having the EPLRS-equipped 
Stryker vehicle in support of the LW.  The EPLRS integration allowed the Stryker unit to 
talk to the lower tactical internet (LTI). As a result of their year-long training, the 4–9 IN 
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commander made the decision to take the LW system with them when they deployed to 
Iraq.  The unit submitted an ONS for 450 LW systems which was validated on January 
11, 2007 (Geddes, 2011). A month later, due to significant Army-wide resource 
challenges, the Army decided not to pursue further development and production of LW 
prototypes (GAO, 2007). Despite the decision to cease development of the LW, the 4–9 
IN deployed with the LW–Manchu system as a result of an ONS in March 2007.   
Typically, an ONS supports a unit’s nonstandard mission in which they are not 
equipped by Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) to accomplish (Headquarters 
United States Army [HQDA], 2011). It was to address situational awareness gaps and 
squad level command and control (C2) gaps, that the 4–9 IN Commander submitted an 
Operational Needs Statement (ONS), as stated previously, resulting in the issue of the 
Land Warrior equipment down to the squad level (HQDA, 2119).  
The ONS submittal process begins at the O-6 level and goes to the Office of the 
Headquarters United States Army (HQDA), G-3/5/7, which is the overall approval 
authority for the process. The G-3/5/7 tries to respond to the ONS within 14 days of 
receipt but can take as long as 30–120 days.  Once validated, the ONS may result in a 
DOTMLPF analysis—a directed requirement resulting in resources directly transferred to 
the unit, or a transfer of pre-positioned equipment, or it may result in no action at all.  In 
situations of an urgent need, the DCS, G-3/5/7 have the authority to conduct a hasty 
assessment within 30 days to meet the warfighters’ needs (HQDA, 2011). 
Officially, in FY2007, the LW program of record was terminated by Claude M. 
Bolton, Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), on February 20, 2007 (DA, 2007a). Prior to 
program termination, GDC4S completed their contract by delivering 450 LW prototypes. 
The terminated LW capabilities were transitioned to the third increment of the FFW NW 
Increment I (NW Inc I)21. 
In response to the Army’s decision to terminate the LW program, the Senate 
Armed Services Committee (SASC) authorized an $80 million plus-up in support of the 
4–9 IN deployment.  They appeared not to be satisfied with the Army’s decision to cancel 
                                                 
21 We discuss this increment in more detail in Chapter IV. 
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the program and these funds ensured sufficient LW quantities to field to the deployed 4–9 
IN battalion in Iraq (United States Senate, 2007). In addition, the committee made the 
following recommendation to the Army:  
The committee urges the Army to review its decision to terminate the Land 
Warrior program. Accordingly, the committee recommends an addition of $30.4 
million in PE 64827A, and $49.5 million in Other Procurement, Army (OPA), to 
continue development of the Land Warrior program, and to procure LRIP items of 
equipment to field to the remaining two battalions of the Stryker brigade combat 
team currently equipped with Land Warrior. (United States Senate, 2007, p. 63)   
Once the program was terminated and the 4–9 IN took the LW to combat, it 
essentially became an advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD). The ACTD 
allows users to test and assess cutting-edge command, control, communications, 
computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities. ACTD is a process which allows programs 
to conduct early and inexpensive evaluation of mature advanced technology. This allows 
the program to vet the technology against the needs of the warfighter. The evaluation is 
accomplished by the warfighter—in the LW’s case, through the in-theater assessment—
to determine military utility before a decision is made to enter into the formal acquisition 
process. Additionally, ACTDs allow for user innovation, to develop and refine 
operational concepts which allow them to take full advantage of the capability (DAU, 
2011b). 
4. FY2008 
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY2008 
The Senate Arms Committee’s previous year’s authorization of $80 million was 
appropriated and increased to $93.9 million in order to support the LW during its 
deployment to Iraq (HR 2642; DA, 2009a)22. As discussed in the Termination Plan for 
the Land Warrior, the project manager, COL Hansen (2007), PEO–Soldier, offered 
extenuating and mitigating circumstances to be considered by the Army Acquisition 
Executive (AAE) while evaluating the program termination. According to the Land 
Warrior Termination Plan (Hansen, 2007, p. 4), 
                                                 
22 This information was retrieved from the May 20, 2008, Congressional Record addressing the 2008 
War Supplemental (HR 2642), provided by John Geddes, Assistant PM LW/NW. 
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Land Warrior Equipping Production (W15P7T-05-C-F201) ($29.7M for 
the Firm Fixed Price contract for LW hardware for the VCSA-directed 
DOTMLPF Assessment and negotiating a Time and Materiels contract for 
OIF Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), total est. is $39M). This 
production contract with GDC4S was awarded to produce the systems 
required for the VCSA-directed DOTMLPF Assessment and LUT 
conducted during 2006. Current activities under this contract include 
buying additional LW components as spares to support 4–9 INF [sic] BN 
(4/2 SBCT) deployment and providing for CLS for both training exercises 
and OIF deployment. We recommend that this contract remain active until 
the end of FY08 to supporting the 4–9 INF [sic] BN (4/2 SBCT) 
deployment. 
Essentially, he was asking the AAE to consider the support plan for the soldiers of 
4–9 IN and the need for additional systems to support their efforts. The PM LW also had 
personnel (FSRs) providing theater support to the deployed system and asked that they be 
retained as well. He received additional systems for spares and retained his FSRs for the 
remainder of the 4–9 IN deployment.  All told, GDC4S delivered 400 LW systems to 
complete their contract in support of the deployed 4–9 IN (Geddes, 2011).  
The LW program also received funds from other contingency operation (OCO)23 
OPA dollars (Geddes, 2011).  The funds sought out for the FY2008 budget would support 
the 5/2 SBCT ONS validated in December 2007 (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-
3/5/7 [DCS, G-3/5/7], 2007).  
5. FY2009  
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY2009 
In FY2009, PM LW refocused the program strategy to begin disposal of the LW–
Manchu and field the LW–Strike.24 In order to support this strategy, the Army requested, 
in their main supplemental funding, $700,000 to begin the LW–Manchu disposal process. 
An additional $48.3 million funded the program through two separate sources: PEO–
Soldier conducted below-threshold reprogramming in their OPA budget for $19.9 
million, and the HQDA conducted an above-threshold reprogramming for $30 million 
                                                 
23 Global War on Terror Supplemental funds are known as other contingency operation or OCO funds. 
24 LW–Strike is discussed in detail in Chapter III. 
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(Geddes, 2011). These funds supported the 2SCR ONS through contracted field service 
representatives (FSR) who supported the program as subject matter experts (DCS, G-
3/5/7, 2009). In addition to the reprogramming listed above, the program received an 
additional $62 million in OPA funds. This would support the fielding of the enhanced 
LW–Strike system to 5/2 SBCT. Fielding of the LW–Strike began in April FY2009 and 
ended in July FY2009. A total of 895 systems were delivered to the Army by GDC4S.  
Additionally this year, the PM became duel hatted when the Nett Warrior 
Increment I (NW Inc I) began its life cycle. In February, the NW Inc I was approved for 
entry into technology development.  The program is estimated to cost $1.6 billion over its 
life cycle for a total of 20,430 NW Inc I systems planned for procurement by the Army. 
The total program funds breakdown for RDT&E is estimated at $179.8 million and $1.48 
billion for procurement. The NW Inc I system, including all GFP and CFP listed in 
Chapter IV, is scheduled to reach low-rate initial production decision authority by 
FY2011 (GAO, 2011).   
In April, the U.S. Army Contracting Command awarded contracts to three 
vendors to develop the NW system for testing and evaluation.  The three contractors were 
each awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee with values between $16.4 and $17 million 
respectively (United States Army Contracting Command [USACC], 2011). 
6. FY2010  
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY2010 
Appropriations for FY2010 totaled $40.2 million which funded redeployment and 
training for units using the LW–Strike system: $9.6 million funded the logistical support 
during the last quarter of 5/2 SBCT deployment; $21.4 million funded the 2SCR NET 
and deployment to Afghanistan; and $9.2 million funded NET for 1/25 SBCT (Geddes, 
2011). 
Beginning January 2010, the NW program began developmental testing on the 
NW Inc I system. In March, the 5/2 SBCT redeployed from Afghanistan and transferred 
895 LW–Strike systems to theater provided equipment (TPE). The 2SCR was still 
preparing for its deployment and was not physically in theater to receive the system 
 85 
directly from 5/2 SBCT. The 2SCR signed for the LW–Strike TPE in May and used the 
system until April 2011. In August the 1/25 SBCT received validation for an ONS to use 
the LW–Strike and support systems being used by 2SCR (DCS, G-3/5/7, 2010).  
Long lead items25 for the NW, under the name Ground Soldier System (GSS)26, 
were procured at $18 million, consisting of RT-1922 radio (Rifleman Radio), GB GRAM 
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) GPS receiver, battery power, and 
SBCT vehicle integration kits (VIK; DOA, 2009a).   
7. FY2011  
a. Acquisition Strategy for FY2011 
As of this writing, the FY2011 funds for the NW were not available and are not 
included in this paper.  
D. SUMMARY OF KEY LAND WARRIOR/NETT WARRIOR DECISIONS 
This chapter discussed the support Congress showed the LW program after it was 
terminated. Congress continues to support the program today. We discussed the decision 
of the Army to terminate the LW program and the implications on the program as a 
result. Some decisions temporarily set the program back, for example, the Dismounted 
Battle Command System (DBCS) program integration in FY2005 that resulted in the 
splitting of the PM LW program funds. Conversely, the failure of the Battle Command 
System which proved unreliable and not ready for fielding helped the PMLW solve 
technology challenges with the integration of the Enhanced Position Location Reporting 
System (EPLRS) radio.  Another example is the decision to field the LW with the 
Manchus of 4–9 IN, whose deployment inspired the SBCT community to believe in the 
capabilities of the LW. The ensuing interoperability with the EPLRS network through a 
Stryker-mounted vehicle integration kit (VIK) could link into the LTI. This led to fielding 
                                                 
25 Advanced procurement funds are used in major acquisition programs for advance procurement of 
components whose long lead-times require purchase early in order to reduce the overall procurement lead-
time of the major end item. 
26 The budget item justification refers to the Ground Soldier System (GSS). For continuity and clarity, 
we will continue to call the GSS the NW. 
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of one battalion within the SBCT community, the 4–9 IN Manchu. The 4–9 IN would 
become the first unit to successfully demonstrate communications from the ground 
soldiers to their leadership through the lower tactical internet (LTI). The LW was no 
longer seen as a light infantry capability; instead it became a staple within the SBCT 
community.   
This chapter discussed the importance of the ONS process and how it ultimately 
became the lifeblood of the LW program following the Army’s decision to cease 
production of any additional prototypes in FY2007. Finally, we discuss the FY funds 
breakout from FY2005 to FY2011 as illustrated in Figure 27.   
 
Figure 27.   FY Budget Breakout from FY2005 to FY2011. 
In FY2006, the 4–9 IN participated in the LW capstone event, a limited user test 
(LUT). Their success in that evaluation encouraged the Army and Congress that the 
program, despite the delays and schedule shifts over the last decade, was still progressing 
toward an MS C decision. Congress’ willingness to support LW (at least as an interim 
solution) was necessary to extend funding of the program after it was terminated in 
FY2007.  
In FY2007, the 4–9 IN received deployment orders to OIF in support of the 
“surge” in Iraq. As the testing unit, this news disrupted the planned equipment evaluation 
scheduled in support of an MS C decision. The Army made the decision to terminate the 
LW program based on budget constraints and the loss of the testing unit, the 4–9 IN, 
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when it deployed to Iraq. Thus began a period during which the LW was funded only in 
support of the ONS. Research suggests that 4–9 IN’s deployment solidified the LW as a 
limited materiel solution that supported the SBCT community for the next five years, 
while providing significant system lessons learned that would help shape the maturation 
of the technology—benefitting both LW and the emerging NW.  
In FY2008, Congress authorized $80 million to support 4–9 IN deployment and 
NET for the 5/2 SBCT conducted in preparation for their deployment to Afghanistan.  
FY2009 was the first year funds were authorized for the NW Inc I in support of its 
entry into technology development. Additionally, long lead items were procured for the 
NW Inc I in anticipation of the FY2011 LUT and down-select. In 4QFY2009, the ONS 
for 2SCR was validated, resulting in the LW program’s third deployment and second 
rotation to Afghanistan.  In 3QFY2011, three vendors were selected to develop NW Inc I 
prototypes for a competitive down-select resulting in a firm-fixed-price contract.  As of 
this writing, a vendor has not been selected.  To date, Congress continues to fund the NW 
program and the PM continues to evolve the program strategy based on guidance and 
policy received from the HQDA and user community. When asking the question, where 
did the funds come from to support the Land Warrior program long after it was cancelled, 
this report suggests the funds span the spectrum of Army budgets. We believe the 4–9 IN 
was pivotal to the extended use of LW—albeit on “life support”; without the 4–9 IN 
ONS, the program would have died in FY2007. Several LW deployments to Iraq and 
Afghanistan smoothed the way for the eventual emergence of the NW program.  
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IV. CASE STUDY SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The NW is the result of the long and turbulent program history of the LW.  Since 
the Cold War, the Army’s priorities have continued to evolve, emphasizing a shift 
towards net-centric warfare as we fight the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and strive 
for overmatch of future combatants. The context in which the requirements for a 
dismounted battle command system were derived and evolved has played an instrumental 
role in the future of NW.  The materiel developer has contributed to the programs many 
successes while encountering stubborn obstacles.  The PM’s efforts can be illustrated as 
attempting to incorporate the edge of technology to meet the program’s functional 
requirements. The greatest challenge the PM has to overcome is immature technology, 
funding instability, and conflicting priorities and perspectives from the user community. 
The PM has yet to find a “one size fits all” solution, evident by the modifications to the 
LW system, the user’s feedback from Afghanistan, the ATEC LUT results, and further 
compounded by differing levels of user buy-in. 
Finally, from a fiscal perspective, a nation that is asked to “do more without 
more,” further exacerbates the pressure for the PM to find a more cost effective materiel 
solution. These constraints lead to mixed results that can be either a hindrance or a 
benefit to the program. Examples of this include the outcome of the 2010 LUT, resulting 
in the fear of cancellation, which caused a new direction for the program. This was 
mainly based on the dependency of an unproven radio system and the 
integration/application challenges of integrating smart phone (EUD) technology. All this 
culminated in the CSB directing the PM to incorporate smart phone technology.  
B. CONCLUSION 
We organized this case study’s conclusion in an effort to merge the previous 
chapters’ fundamental topics related to the NW current status.  By highlighting the key 
lessons learned, we can better understand the driving forces behind the NW acquisition 
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(historical context, user representatives, materiel developers, warfighters, and funding), 
draw conclusions, and generate recommendations for potential ways ahead for similar 
acquisition programs. In addition, we can incorporate some of the lessons learned from 
the CSB’s involvement with the NW program into the strategic perspective of DoD 
acquisition. Lastly, we provide recommendations for further research as the topic of a 
digitized, networked soldier will continue to be a topic of importance and concern.   
From our perspective there were four key turning points in the development of the 
NW program, as follows: 
1. A battalion commander’s decision to take LW into Iraq contributed to the 
4–9 IN’s success in a combat environment.  The 4–9 IN’s efforts saved not only the LW 
program, but breathed new life into the effort to digitize the soldier. This eventually led 
to the development of the NW. 
Through the ONS process, a deploying commander requested the LW system for 
his battalion.  This laid the groundwork for follow-on SBCT’s—based on 4–9 IN 
success—to realize the capability of LW and similarly submit an ONS requesting the 
system.  While fulfilling operational needs, the PM LW was able to harness soldier 
feedback to improve the LW system.  In effect, the Army’s scrapped program received a 
reprieve, for limited use, because it was the best choice to fill capability gaps in combat. 
System use in Iraq permitted onsite support personnel (USIs, FSRs, and TCM–S) to 
gather soldier feedback that could be used to improve the system. This operational 
experience allowed technology maturation of the NW equivalent to the technology 
development phase of a traditional acquisition life cycle.  
An ongoing challenge inherent to any new system is user buy-in, which is critical 
to system success.  User buy-in is encouraged by resourcing a unit with adequate systems 
in order to train and become familiar with the new equipment. The Manchus trained on 
the system for over a year prior to deploying and favored the system. Due to a limited 
availability of training systems, units after 4–9 IN were not afforded the same 
opportunities to become familiar with the system. These units received the LW–Strike 
system as theater provided equipment (TPE) and had, at best, four months of training. 
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When you look at their training schedules, research shows the blocks of training were one 
to two days, divided by weeks of other deployment training tasks.  Essentially, this 
training was nothing as substantial as the training 4–9 IN received.   
During the course of the LW’s time in combat, user buy-in demonstrated a 
diminishing scale of acceptance based on the emergence of smart phone technology. 
Reviewing the overall success of the program, comparing the 4–9 IN ITA and the last 
three units’ feedback, the highest program growth was achieved during 4–9 IN and then 
the user acceptance began to drop. Beginning with 5/2 SBCT, research shows soldiers 
wanted the technology of the LW but packaged similar to that of a smart phone in size 
and weight.  A discussion with NW APM John Geddes (2011) revealed that the unit that 
will conduct a Relief In Place (RIP) with 1/25 SBCT did not submit an ONS for the LW. 
Instead, the unit chose to wait for the Army to field the smart phone technology. Mission 
tempo and type are additional reasons for the decline of solider buy-in during operations 
in Afghanistan. The utility of the NW system is dependent on the ability of a unit to 
generate a robust network in the terrain they are fighting in. The largely mountainous and 
isolated terrain does not lend itself fully to the capabilities provided by the EPLRS 
network. We note this specifically in our discussion on the 2SCR post combat surveys in 
Chapter III.   
2. The continuous ONS submissions reinforced the user need for the LW 
soldier system long after the Army terminated the program.  The user’s feedback over 
four combat deployments was the foundation for the NW program.  Through the user in-
theater tests, the NW benefited significantly from technology improvements from the LW 
program.   
The ONS process is unique to the LW program, in that it allowed the system to 
continue serving the warfighter after the program was terminated. When you look at the 
program holistically, the LW systems’ purpose was specific to enhanced SA for the light 
infantry combat teams. Based on today’s GWOT mission, we are no longer fighting 
predominately with the light infantry. Combine that with the CSB de-scoping efforts 
resulting in a lighter and more cost-effective program, the Army is now postured with a 
solution that fits the needs across the force structure. 
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The lesson is that the ONS provided a non-standard way to mature the 
technology.  Through the LW program the Army provided soldiers SA that was better 
than they had, while affording PM LW/NW an opportunity to gather feedback from an 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). 
3. The ATEC results proved to be more than the program could overcome. 
Hoping to achieve an MS C decision based on their performance in the October 2010 
LUT, the NW program once again failed to prove its overall effectiveness.  In the Army’s 
eyes, the program had failed to receive approval to “prime time.”  The lesson learned is 
that technology was not sufficiently mature to support NW. 
4. The 2011 CSB modification to the NW requirements proved to be the 
most recent and perhaps the most important event to date. This allowed the de-scoping of 
the materiel developer’s efforts.  The PM refocused the program strategy on the most 
beneficial and openly praised capabilities of all previous versions of the NW (enhanced 
SA, accurate position location, and precise navigation).  PM NW was released from an 
array of system requirements that exceeded current technological capabilities. The CSB’s 
actions may prove to be a crucial turning point for the future of the networked soldier.        
Through the CSB, the PM NW was authorized to incorporate emerging 
commercial technology.  As mentioned in Chapter IV, this allowed the PM to pursue a 
materiel solution that was 70% lighter and saved the Army more than 50% in overall 
cost. While these decisions resulted in a lighter and more cost-efficient program, it also 
left significant risk to NW. The system PM was no longer responsible for the radio 
system that would mesh the NW with the network. This made the system dependent on 
the maturation of the RR program. We note that the difference between the LW and NW 
communications system is that the LW was on a parallel path with the RR and planned to 
incorporate it when it became available. The NW is on a converging path with the RR, 
which means the NW program’s success is directly tied to the success of the RR.        
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C. ANALYSIS OF THE ACQUISITION STRATEGY ELEMENTS 
In this section, we examine how the NW program addressed key elements of an 
acquisition strategy. The four key elements of NW’s acquisition strategy this report 
focuses on are: mission need, test and evaluation, technology, and risk management.    
1. MISSION NEED 
Evidenced by the four operational need statements submitted between 2007 and 
2010, soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan required a system that provided SA over-match in 
the dismounted fight. The urgency for delivering a dismounted soldier system meant 
soldier were willing to take a system like the LW, which had been terminated in February 
2007; although the LW had flaws that prevented it from becoming the Army’s standard 
dismounted soldier system, it did exhibit useful attributes that filled operational gaps, 
which made it the best system available for limited use when urgent needs required it.  
The CSB’s actions reinforced the urgency with which the Army intended to 
deliver a networked dismounted soldier system. The PM and user representatives were 
empowered to shift focus towards delivering a less expensive, limited scope device that 
was readily available. The success of 4–9 IN’s operations in Iraq demonstrated the 
benefits of the soldier system. The LW enabled the dismounted soldier to operate in 
unfamiliar and dense or urban terrain with similar SA to that of the mounted elements 
using Blue Force Tracker (BFT) systems.  
2. TEST AND EVALUATION  
Since LW–Strike was not a program of record, the PM was unable to make 
significant improvements to the LW system. By incorporating the radio, battery, and 
software from the LW–Strike system, the NW also inherited the shortcomings of those 
components which included communication, reliability, and weight issues. During the 
NW LUT in 2010, these shortcomings were reported by ATEC’s assessment.  The results 
of the NW LUT should have been no surprise, due to the operational feedback received 
from Afghanistan. The comments from 2SCR’s post-combat survey identified several 
system challenges; the one of the most significance was the limited communication range 
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while operating in steep, rugged terrain. In such terrain, dismounted elements were not 
supported by a vehicle-mounted EPLRS network, which resulted in significantly 
decreased network range. In addition, it was noted that the weight, bulk, and 
sustainability of the system during dismounted operations was a significant burden.   
In our view, the four combat deployments with LW-equipped units provided an 
extensive advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) for NW. In this aspect, 
the NW program had a distinct advantage over other programs. Typical testing 
environments do not fully achieve the stress and variability of actual combat. This paper 
suggests the four operational deployments enabled the PM and TCM–S to gather relevant 
and realistic feedback concerning a dismounted soldier system and permitted opportunity 
for experimentation. However, it must be mentioned that, unlike more tightly controlled 
test environments, actual combat conditions presented challenges in gathering complete 
data from both soldier feedback and system failures.    
3. TECHNOLOGY 
By incorporating seemingly mature technology from the LW system, the NW 
intended to achieve a higher technology development rating, leading to the abbreviated 
acquisition strategy. But without significant improvements to the radio, software, and 
battery, the NW system was unlikely to make substantial improvements to performance 
and sustainability. As demonstrated in Afghanistan, soldiers will continue to fight in 
various types of terrain which will not only place strain on the soldier, but may also 
exceed the limits of our technological capabilities. Connectivity within the EPLRS 
network and limited range remain a challenged to the LW system.  
The CSB’s decision to de-scope the requirements put NW on a new technological 
path. The CSB signaled a transition in the acquisition community to deliver products in a 
timely manner comprised of more relevant technology. The introduction of the smart 
phone device provided the mature technology required to maintain the current level of 
capabilities while substantially reducing weight. The NW program was finally 
authorized, and seems positioned, to deliver a materiel solution that soldiers have been 
asking for, a “LW-Lite.”  Since 1993 the Army has been trying to provide a capability to 
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soldiers that was simply not technologically mature. Although it appears that the 
technology may now be mature enough to support the NW requirements, the final answer 
to this must await completion of rigorous developmental and operational testing of the 
new version that integrates RR and EUD into Nett Warrior. 
4. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Use of the LW technology was intended to reduce technology risk, accelerate the 
development of the NW, and decrease the program’s life cycle cost. Unfortunately, little 
weight was shed because the vendors were provided the battery, CPU, and radio from the 
previous system—collectively the bulk of the weight the system needed to shed. This 
strategy put the NW program at risk as operational feedback continued to indicate that the 
LW system weighed too much.   
At the Army level, the CSB’s involvement with the NW program served as a risk 
mitigation mechanism. The CSB considered ATEC’s recommendations that the NW 
system not deploy until the system demonstrated an improved technical performance. The 
CSB’s directive to incorporate a smart phone technology device enabled the PM to make 
major changes to the program’s direction while minimizing the impacts to overall 
program cost and schedule. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Land Warrior and Nett Warrior are examples of programs that tried to use 
technology that was immature and unready to support the system. This was a major 
failing in the emerging LW and NW programs.  Programs must demonstrate that they are 
technologically ready to move beyond Milestone B. Evident by the poor showing in the 
2010 NW LUT results and involvement by the CSB.  
Dismounted soldiers continue to have capability gaps that need immediate 
solutions for soldiers in combat. The Operational Need Statement (ONS) provided a 
useful mechanism that assisted deployed and deploying forces limited materiel solutions 
in the form of developmental systems not yet ready for standard issue.  The answer to 
 96 
filling a gap may be an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD), which is, 
in fact, what LW really became after it was terminated. 
The Configuration Steering Board (CSB) showed its worth in the case of NW, by 
permitting relief from requirements and the direction to adopt smart phone technology.  
Trigger CSBs should be required for any system that stumbles at a milestone decision 
point. 
The NW program is not out of the woods yet. Although the End User Device 
(EUD) and Rifleman’s Radio (RR) offer an innovative integrated solution, the success of 
this approach must be proven in rigorous developmental and operational test & 
evaluation. Programs should never be pushed along to the next acquisition phase without 
demonstrating readiness to meet typical exit requirements. That includes NW—even after 
the CSB rescued it from the brink. It must demonstrate it can meet KPPs and that it is 
reliable, affordable, suitable, effective, and survivable. 
From a strategic perspective, there are several key takeaways to consider: 
• Although not ideal, soldier feedback from operational deployments warrant 
additional scrutiny. Due to the mortality of a combat situation, soldiers make 
candid comments that should be exploited when refining the user requirements.  
• Adapting commercial technology to meet military requirements does not always 
lead to reductions in program cost and schedule. 
• TRADOC is responsible for generating the requirements for the Army. However, 
TRADOC may not be able to accurately derive Army needs. TRADOC must 
become more attune to the ever changing needs of the soldier. Without properly 
defining the requirement, a program manager cannot be expected to deliver a one 
size fits all type of solution.   
E. PATH FORWARD 
The value of a battle command system  has been proven several times over to the 
Army, which explains the two decades of development that has led up to this point. 
Soldier systems and technology are on a critical path. These systems will become 
common across the Army. Likewise, many other countries have developed soldier 
systems similar in capability to the NW.  
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The long-term goals for the NW program call for integration into a unified battle 
command system. One of the most significant objectives involves creating an almost 
omnipotent awareness and understanding of friendly and enemy forces across a fully 
networked battlefield. The resulting synergy will foster a common operating picture that 
fully integrates Army ground, mounted, and aviation; rotary and fixed-wing. The network 
of the future will facilitate decentralized operations across a non-contiguous battlefield 
with no disruption to communications across the Service branches.  
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As the future of the NW program remains unclear, numerous questions remain 
unanswered and provide an opportunity to make recommendations for further research 
and study. 
First, an on-going challenge is associated with providing a dismounted, networked 
soldier system capability to the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). This issue 
continues to be one of the biggest hurdles for future soldier systems. Lacking platforms to 
host network enablers, the IBCT lacks robust communications architecture.  
Second, the notion of leveraging soldier-driven, human factored engineering was 
a strength of the 4–9 IN experience.  The Army has created an evaluation unit, the 5th 
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at 
Fort Bliss, TX, and the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment Experimental Force 
(EXFOR), for this very purpose. It would be beneficial to the Army acquisition 
community to study how these organizations can be leveraged to maximize risk 
reduction, improve upon human factors engineering, and harvest user feedback from an 
operational environment.  
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